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Model Rule 8.4(g) and the Profession’s Core Values Problem 
Abstract.  Model Rule 8.4(g) declares it misconduct for a lawyer to “engage 
in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”  The American 
Bar Association (ABA) adopted the rule in 2016 in large part to effectuate the 
third of its four mission goals: Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity.  The ABA 
adopted these goals in 2008, and they continue to serve as ABA’s statement of 
its mission.   
A substantial number of lawyers opposed the ABA’s adoption of Rule 8.4(g), 
most often on free speech and religious liberty grounds.  Since its adoption by 
the ABA, lawyers have argued for and against state adoption of Rule 8.4(g), in 
part based on competing understandings of the “core values” at stake in this 
debate. 
References to the core values of the American legal profession emerged 
relatively recently.  They are also often mentioned absent any particular 
definition.  Not surprisingly, lawyers disagree about whether some normative 
declaration expresses a core value for American lawyers.  They also disagree 
whether there exists a hierarchical ranking of core values, and if so, how to 
organize core values in tension with one another.  In part, this represents a long-
existing debate among lawyers about how to fulfill one’s duties to client, court, 
third parties, and community.  It also reflects a split among American lawyers.  
The American legal profession has been fractured along a number of axes for a 




they work alone, in Big Law, in government, in corporations, and in legal 
aid/public interest entities; they represent disparate types of clients, such as 
individuals and organizations, and within those hemispheres, they represent 
persons and organization with diverse legal needs and interests; they work in 
small towns and large cities; they earn millions and support themselves by taking 
second jobs; and they differ in their views regarding the usual subjects, politics, 
culture, and religion.  Such a disaggregated group will struggle to form a 
consensus, much less an overwhelming majority, about what values lie at the 
core of a definition of “lawyer,” “legal profession,” the “practice of law,” or 
“the lawyer’s duties.”  The Rule 8.4(g) debate may offer some insight into why 
the parties seem to speak past one another, and whether any core values are 
embraced across the divisions within the legal profession.  Relatedly, the ABA’s 
shrinking membership reflects the difficulty of speaking of a (singular) legal 
profession, and the decline in the ABA’s influence indicates it is less likely to be 
able to generate a broader acceptance of specific core values as reflected in rules 
such as 8.4(g). 
Author.  Professor Michael Ariens is the Aloysius A. Leopold Professor of 
Law at St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas.  He would like to thank 
Elise McLaren and Sameer Bhuchar for their research assistance. 
Professor Ariens has written a book concerning the history of American lawyer 
ethics, titled REMNANTS OF CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWYER 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
At the August 2003 annual meeting of the American Bar Association 
(ABA), members of its House of Delegates debated whether to approve two 
proposed amendments to Model Rule 1.6(b).1  These amendments created 
additional exceptions to the lawyer’s duty to keep a client’s confidences.2  
The House had balked at doing so two years earlier,3 when the Commission 
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, popularly known as 
the Ethics 2000 Commission, made its recommendations.4  The ABA’s 
decision to reconsider arose after the large energy corporation, Enron, filed 
for bankruptcy amid allegations of financial improprieties in early December 
2001.5  The once-rejected exceptions were re-offered and supported by a 
coalition of twelve ABA presidents, twelve ABA section cosponsors, and 
the “Conference of Chief Justices,” an organization of state supreme court 
chief justices.6  Despite this firepower, a significant debate took place about 
the compatibility of these exceptions with the legal profession’s core 
values.7  Both sides claimed they were the true defenders of the profession’s 
 
1. See Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1,  
14–19 (2003) (providing the debate over Report 119A, which sought to add two provisions to Model 
Rule 1.6). 
2. Id.  The proposed exceptions it adopted allowed a lawyer to disclose a client confidence  
“to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used 
or is using the lawyer’s services,” and “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”  
Report No. 1 of the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility et al., 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A 499, 499–500 (2003) 
(recommending adding Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3)). 
3. See Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 35–37 
(2001) (striking the proposed additions to Rule 1.6(b)).  The Ethics 2000 Committee, proposing 
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, suggested three changes to Model 
Rule 1.6(b).  The Delegates approved only one amendment, which permitted (but did not require) a 
lawyer to disclose a client confidence “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”  
Id. at 61–62.  
4. Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
257, 257, 261 (2001). 
5. Two excellent studies of the fall of Enron are KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS:  
A TRUE STORY (2005) and BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (10th Anniversary ed. 2013).  For a 
pointillist study of the history of the Model 1.6(b) amendments, see generally Michael Ariens, “Playing 
Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PRO. 239 (2009). 
6. Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 14 
(2003). 
7. Id. at 14–19. 
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core values.  Incoming ABA president, Dennis W. Archer, supported the 
proposed exceptions.8  He argued, “confidentiality, professional integrity, 
independence, and autonomy are core values which are sacrificed when a 
lawyer is deprived of the ability to reveal information necessary to prevent 
a client from misusing the profession and the lawyer’s services to commit a 
crime, fraud, causing substantial harm to innocent third parties.”9  The 
incoming President-elect (that is, Archer’s successor), Robert J. Grey, Jr., 
argued in opposition to the proposed amendments to Rule 1.6(b).10  In his 
view, “this was not the time to take the position that the core values of this 
profession are subject to compromise.”11  Grey was joined by Sharon Stern 
Gerstman, a member of the ABA’s Board of Governors.12  She argued the 
House had properly “refused to allow its core values to diminish”13 when 
it rejected those amendments in 2001.  The House of Delegates approved 
the amendments in a recorded vote by just 218 to 201.14 
This was the second debate about core values in the House of Delegates 
in three years.  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4(a) (1983) 
generally prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.15  
Rule 5.4(b) bans a lawyer from forming “a partnership with a nonlawyer if 
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.”16  
Both provisions were justified on the belief that allowing lawyers and 
nonlawyers to join together to offer legal and other professional services 
(e.g., accounting) in a jointly-owned entity might permit the latter to control 
the relationship between lawyer and client.17  Such control, supporters of 
these Rules traditionally argued, might harm the interests of the lawyer’s 
 
8. Id. at 18. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 16. 
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 17. 
13. Id.  
14. Id. at 18 (recording the vote); see also James Podgers, The Non-Revolution: Proponents of a New 
ABA Ethics Rule on Confidentiality Downplay Its Impact, 89 A.B.A J. 80, 80 (Oct. 2003) (recounting the 
debate). 
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2020). 
16. Id. at R. 5.4(b). 
17. See id. at R. 5.4 cmts. 1 & 2 (indicating the Rule expresses traditional limitations regarding 
the importance of an attorney’s independence and professional judgment in rendering advice to a 
client). 
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clients.  The usual argument was that profits would come before duty to 
legal client.18   
By the late 1990s, the largest accounting firms (then the “Big Five”) 
employed thousands of lawyers.19  The Big Five offered their clients tax, 
accounting, consulting, regulatory, and other services, including services 
often provided by lawyers.  This worried large law firms, the part of the 
organized bar that often competed with the Big Five.20  These firms feared 
they faced a competitive disadvantage if the traditional rules remained.  That 
fear led the ABA to reconsider the ethics rules banning multidisciplinary 
practice (MDP) organizations owned by both lawyers and nonlawyers.21  It 
created a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in August 1998 to 
recommend how the ABA should proceed.22 
The Commission reported back a year later in support of amending the 
rules and permitting lawyers “to deliver legal services through a 
multidisciplinary practice.”23  For reasons relating to internal ABA politics, 
its recommendation was postponed.24  The Commission returned a year 
later, reaffirming its recommendation.25  It added the proviso that any 
specific changes to the Model Rules be implemented to protect the public 
and preserve “the core values of the legal profession, including competence, 
independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client 
information, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts of 
 
18. See id. (drawing a comparison to Rule 1.8(f), which permits a lawyer to accept payment from 
a third party so long as it did not interfere “with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment” and 
the client gave informed consent). 
19. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. 
REV. 869, 878 & n.31 (1999) (counting 6,362 lawyers in Big Five firms other than tax lawyers). 
20. See id. at 878–79 (indicating, when a leading journal combined “statistics of the Big Five 
firms with the statistics from traditional law firms,” a list “of the ten largest law firms worldwide 
included three of the Big Five”). 
21. See Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 223, 225 (1999) 
[hereinafter Report] (indicating the ABA president, in response to professional service firms delivering 
legal services, formed a commission to determine if the ABA should amend Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to address the situation). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 223. 
24. The Florida Bar pushed for delay.  See Report of the Florida Bar, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 753, 
753 (1999) (recommending the ABA delay changing the Model Rules); Proceedings for the Annual Meeting 
of the House of Delegates, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 10–14 (1999) (recording the debate on and decision 
to delay). 
25. Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 183, 183 (2000) 
[hereinafter Multidisciplinary Report]. 
  
186 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:180 
interest, and pro bono publico obligations.”26  The ABA House of Delegates 
rejected the Commission’s recommendation at its August 2000 meeting.27  
It then resolved to adopt a set of core values of the profession.  It urged 
states considering whether to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs to make 
their decisions in such a way as to “preserve the core values of the legal 
profession.”28  As adopted by the House, those values overlapped but were 
not congruent with the Commission’s core values.29 
These two debates suggested both that invoking core values in an 
argument was perceived as necessary to win a debate, and that the content 
of the American legal profession’s core values was unsettled at best, and 
malleable and lacking any definitional rigor at worst.  These propositions do 
not mesh well. 
When H. Thomas Wells became ABA president in mid-2008, he wrote in 
his first monthly column for the ABA Journal that his presidency would 
concentrate on making progress on four of “the common core values all 
lawyers share”: “access to justice, independence of the bar and judiciary, 
diversity and the rule of law.”30  That same year, the ABA formally adopted 
four “goals” intended to aid the ABA in meeting its mission.  Those goals 
were: “[s]erve [o]ur [m]embers,” “[i]mprove [o]ur [p]rofession,” “[e]liminate 
[b]ias and [e]nhance [d]iversity,” and “[a]dvance the [r]ule of [l]aw.”31  Each 
goal included several specific measures.32 
The ABA House of Delegates adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) at its 2016 
annual meeting in significant part to make progress on the ABA’s third goal: 
 
26. Id. 
27. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 24 (2000). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 24–25.  The most important difference was an emphasis in the House of Delegates on 
the lawyer’s duty to the public.  The House’s fifth core value was “the lawyer’s duty to help maintain a 
single profession of law with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, 
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”  Id. at 24.  The language 
listing the lawyer’s multiple “responsibilities” is taken directly from Preamble [1] of the Model Rules.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  The demise of Enron, which 
was quickly followed by the indictment and conviction of the Big Five accounting firm of Arthur 
Andersen, BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 143–44 & 406 (10th Anniversary ed. 2013), led 
states to halt efforts to amend Rule 5.4.  See Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the 
Very Black Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002) (recounting, by a fervent opponent of MDPs, 
how “Enron proved the death knell of MDPs”).  
30. H. Thomas Wells Jr., Justice to the Core, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2008, at 9. 
31. ABA Mission and Goals, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-
goals/ [https://perma.cc/8VV9-6CKE]. 
32. See id. (listing each goal’s objective). 
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“[e]liminate [b]ias and [e]nhance [d]iversity.”33  It did so with “no debate in 
the House and few overt signs of opposition” when it came time for 
discussion and vote.34  However, it is also clear that significant debate and 
opposition occurred in the roughly year-long process prior to the ABA’s 
adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g).35  Model Rule 8.4(g) declares it misconduct 
for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the 
practice of law.”36  It also includes two exceptions:  “This paragraph does 
not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a 
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.  This paragraph does not 
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”37  
Model Rule 8.4(g) demands lawyers consider the question of core values.  
Proponents of Rule 8.4(g) wanted a rule with more teeth to lessen (if not 
end) invidious discrimination in the profession.38  Rule 8.4(g) would go 
some way to meeting the ABA’s third goal, to “eliminate bias and enhance 
diversity.”  One argument its opponents used centered on its possible 
impact on the core value of the independence of lawyers from state 
control.39  This tension between core values is unlikely to dissipate.  
The goal of this Article is to examine the rise of the idea of the 
profession’s core values and how that idea informs the divided reception of 
Model Rule 8.4(g).  Since its adoption in the ABA, states have been at odds 
in deciding whether to adopt it as a rule of discipline for their lawyers.  This 
Article begins with a survey of the background of the principles espoused 
in the ABA’s lawyer ethics rules from the adoption of the Canons of Ethics 
in 1908.  It then discusses the reasons for the debate on the profession’s 
 
33. Id.; see Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(G): 
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PRO. 201, 204, 211, 221 
(2017) (noting only one ABA section mentioned any goal other than Goal III). 
34. Lorelei Laird & James Podgers, House Passes Bias Rule, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2016, at 59. 
35. See Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 204, 219–23 (describing the process leading up to 
Model Rule 8.4(g)’s adoption). 
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
37. Id. 
38. See generally Laird & Podgers, supra note 34 (describing how many proponents of Rule 8.4(g) 
believed the Model Rules needed a binding provision to prohibit discrimination and harassment).  
39. See id. at 59 (describing how the Rule’s opposition worried the Rule would, for example, 
“undermine free speech and religious freedom”). 
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core values.  After discussing the history of Rule 8.4(g), it assesses the 
responses in the profession to the proposal. 
II.    ILLUSTRATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 
A. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) 
The ABA committee that drafted the Canons of Ethics (1908) included a 
number of well-known legal ethics writers, the most important of whom 
was Thomas Goode Jones.  Jones wrote the first code of ethics, adopted by 
the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887.40  The Alabama code included 
an oath and fifty-seven canons of ethics, and served as the blueprint for the 
ABA.41  As adopted, the ABA code of ethics consisted of an oath and thirty-
two canons of ethics.42  It was praised by many,43 and by 1914, thirty-one 
state bar associations had adopted it.44  A few, however, were disappointed.  
The most important of those dissenters was Charles A. Boston, a New York 
lawyer.45  From 1908 until shortly before his death in 1935, Boston spent a 
 
40. Thomas Goode Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS 
GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 45, 45–59 (Carol Rice 
Andrews et al. eds., 2003); see also BRENT J. AUCOIN, THOMAS GOODE JONES: RACE, POLITICS, AND 
JUSTICE IN THE NEW SOUTH 19 (2016) (explaining how Jones’s “most noteworthy accomplishment 
as a lawyer” was writing the legal “profession’s first ever Code of Legal Ethics” adopted by the Alabama 
State Bar Association). 
41. See generally Jones, supra note 40 (providing the oath and fifty-seven canons of ethics); see also 
AUCOIN, supra note 40, at 19 (indicating Jones’s Code of Legal Ethics “served as the basis for the Code 
of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1907”). 
42. CANONS OF ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908). 
43. See generally Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 541 
(1908) (praising the code).  Baldwin founded the ABA in 1878.  See JOHN AUSTIN MATZKO, BEST 
MEN OF THE BAR: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1878–1928, at 14–24 
(2019) (explaining how “Baldwin moved that a committee of three be appointed to consider the 
propriety of organizing a national association of lawyers”); EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 3–13 (1953) (providing a history of the beginnings 
of the American Bar Association); Charles C. Goetsch, Baldwin, Simeon Eben, in THE YALE 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 25 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (“Baldwin was 
the key founder of the American Bar Association in 1878 . . . .”). 
44. Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics, 37 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 559, 560–61 & n.3 (1914) 
(listing thirty plus Arizona).  All state bar associations were voluntary at this time.  The mandatory bar 
movement, which required every lawyer licensed in a state to be a member of the state bar association, 
began in 1920.  See DAYTON DAVID MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 21–29 (1963) (providing a 
brief history of bar integration in the United States).   
45. William W. Miller, Charles A. Boston, 1863–1935, A.B.A. J., May 1935, at 281; Frederick C. 
Hicks, Boston, Charles Anderson, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICA BIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT 1, at 98 
(1944). 
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significant amount of time volunteering his services to bar associations to 
promote lawyer ethics.46 
Boston criticized the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics for failing to 
draft a set of principles and, instead, offering illustrations of behavior that 
were condoned or condemned.47  As Boston became more immersed in the 
subject of lawyer ethics, his opinion of the Canons hardened.  This was a 
consequence of his work as chairman of the professional ethics committee 
of the New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA).48  Boston 
convinced the NYCLA Board that the ethics committee should offer 
guidance to lawyers by answering their ethics questions.  It began to do so 
in 1913.49  By the early 1920s, Boston believed the Canons were out-of-
date, as the illustrations were so specific they too often failed to address 
current ethics problems.  He stated: “I think that comparatively few of the 
questions submitted to our [NYCLA ethics] committee could be answered 
by any provision of the canons.”50   
Boston was appointed chairman of the ABA Committee on 
Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics in 1924.51  The 
committee published its draft proposals in the ABA Journal in  
 
46. Boston served as the chairman of the professional ethics committee of the New York 
County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA) from 1909 until 1932.  For much of that time it was the most 
important ethics committee in the country, for, at Boston’s urging, it was the first ethics committee to 
answer ethics questions asked by practitioners.  See The Legal Ethics Clinic of the New York County Lawyers 
Association, 7 ILL. L. REV. 554, 554 (1913) (discussing NYCLA’s service in answering ethics questions 
proposed by members of the bar).  Boston was an original member and the second chairman of the 
ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics from 1913 to 1916.  From 1921 to 1924, he served as 
secretary to the ABA Committee on Canons of Judicial Ethics and was responsible for drafting the 
Canons of Judicial Ethics.  From 1924 to 1928, he was the chairman and principal draftsman of the 
Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics.  He continued to serve as chairman of 
that committee off and on from 1928 until 1934.  This information is taken from the list of committee 
members published in the Annual Report of the American Bar Association, as well as the annual 
reports to the ABA.  See, e.g., infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 45, at 
281–82 (describing Boston’s various roles and impact on the area of legal ethics). 
47. Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 224, 225 (1908). 
48. Cf. supra note 46 (describing Boston’s work as NYCLA chairman).  
49. See supra note 46 (describing how Boston urged the NYCLA to begin answering ethics 
questions posed by practitioners).  
50. Thomas Francis Howe, The Proposed Amendment to the By-Laws, A.B.A. J., July 1922, at 436 
(quoting Boston). 
51. See Special Committees, 47 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 24, 26 (1924) (listing Boston as chairman of the 
Special Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics). 
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mid-1927.52  The final proposed supplemental canon was titled Summary of 
the Professional Ideals of the Lawyer.53  
This summary canon was written by Henry Wynans Jessup, also a New 
York lawyer and member of the ABA Committee.54  Boston and Jessup had 
worked together on the NYCLA’s ethics committee from 1908 until Jessup 
resigned in 1924.  They were long-time friends with a deep interest in 
working out the ethical standards of the legal profession.  Both agreed that 
the failure of the ABA Code was that it lacked reference to principles. 
Jessup had been working on a summary of professional ideals for nearly 
two decades.  He published his summary in a 1922 essay55 and in a 1925 
book.56  It was slightly modified and adopted by the committee, but one 
member of Boston’s committee, Massachusetts lawyer Frank W. Grinnell, 
dissented from Jessup’s Summary of the Professional Ideals of the Lawyer.57  
Controversies over several proposed supplemental canons led Boston to 
move to postpone consideration of the Supplemental Canons.  ABA 
members agreed.  Though Grinnell was the only dissenting voice on the 
fifteen-person committee in 1927, the Summary Canon was not among the 
proposed additions the following year.58 
Five years later, the ABA made additional changes to the Canons of 
Ethics.59  For several of these years, including 1933, Charles Boston was 
the chairman of the special committee in charge of this project.  In addition 
to proposed changes, the committee issued a Statement of General Principles of 
Legal Ethics.60  Boston’s introduction to the Statement lamented that the ABA 
Canons were written only “as applicable to selected situations,” or as 
 
52. See generally Proposed Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, A.B.A. J., May 1927, at 268 
(presenting “the text of the Proposed Canons as approved by the majority of” the Special Committee 
on Supplementing the Canons of Professional Ethics). 
53. Id. at 271–73. 
54. Id. at 269 (noting initial proposed supplemental canons, “including a final canon, prepared 
by Mr. Henry W. Jessup, summariz[ed], in a generic way, the principles underlying all of the canons”).   
55. Henry W. Jessup, The Ethics of the Legal Profession, 101 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
16, 25–29 (1922).  
56. HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF 
LEGAL ETHICS 11–14 (1925). 
57. Proposed Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, supra note 52, at 273; see also Report of the 
Special Committee on Supplements to Canons of Professional Ethics, 50 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 372, 390–95 (1927) 
(dissenting from Jessup’s proposed supplemental Canon and offering a substitute). 
58. Important Supplemental Canons of Ethics Proposed, A.B.A. J., May 1928, at 292, 292. 
59. Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 41, 152–80 (1933). 
60. Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, 56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 428, 437–40 (1933). 
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“illustrative,” and did not include “a statement of general principles.”61  
Though the committee did not recommend the ABA initiate such an effort, 
it invited ABA members to consider principles of legal ethics to guide lawyer 
behavior. 
The principles were based on work done by Boston and Jessup in 1910 
for the NYCLA.62  The 1933 iteration of a Summary of Professional Ideals of the 
Lawyer consisted of sixteen items.63  These items were framed in relational 
terms: among others, lawyer to legal system, lawyer to client, and lawyer to 
community.64  The lawyer’s duty to the members of the community in 
which the lawyer lived was one of “peculiar responsibility.”65  The lawyer 
owed the community the duty to expose judicial corruption, to report for 
professional discipline lawyers engaged in professional misconduct, and to 
protect the rights and liberties of community members according to law.66 
The lawyer was not simply an instrument of a client’s desires, but 
responsible for protecting the broader community, nearly all of whom were 
not clients.   
Boston’s invitation was never taken up by the organized bar. 
B. Code of Professional Responsibility (1969)  
In 1964, the ABA created a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical 
Standards.67  Five years later, it adopted the committee’s proposed Code of 
Professional Responsibility without amendment.68  The Code consisted of 
nine Canons.  Within each of the nine Canons the Code listed Ethical 
Considerations, aspirational in nature, and Disciplinary Rules, mandatory in 
 
61. Id. at 437. 
62. See EDWIN DAVID ROBERTSON, BRETHREN AND SISTERS OF THE BAR: A CENTENNIAL 
HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION 33 (2008) (describing the work done 
during 1910); see also Charles A. Boston, The Recent Movement Toward the Realization of High Ideals in the 
Legal Profession, 35 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 761, 771–73 (1912) (discussing unsuccessful effort to persuade 
NYCLA adopt a code of ethics). 
63. See Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, supra note 60, at 439 (providing the sixteen 
items that composed the “statement of the professional duties of the lawyer in [New York]”). 
64. See id. (addressing the lawyer’s duties to support the law and the lawyer’s relations with 
clients and community). 
65. Id. (referencing item twelve). 
66. Id. 
67. Proceedings of the House of Delegates at the 1964 Annual Meeting, 89 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 365, 383 
(1964). 
68. Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 378, 
389–92 (1969). 
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nature.69  The Canons included several broad statements of the lawyer’s 
duty.  For example, Canon 1 indicated, “A Lawyer Should Assist in 
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession,” and 
Canon 8 stated, “A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.”70  
Others completely missed the mark: Canon 3, “A Lawyer Should Assist in 
Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,”71 reeked of economic self-
interest rather than protection of the public.  Both Canon 4 (“A Lawyer 
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client”) and Canon 7 (“A 
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the 
Law”)72 were drafted at a relatively specific level of generality.  Both 
concerned the broader idea of the extent of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to 
clients.  In general, these canons offered little in the way of principle. 
The Preamble to the Code, on the other hand, was intended to serve as a 
statement of professional principles.  “[A] free and democratic society” 
could exist only when its members believed that justice was possible.73  This 
justice was “based upon the rule of law.”74  Lawyers were the “guardians of 
the law,”75 making justice possible.  As a result, lawyers served a “vital role 
in the preservation of society.”76  This vital role included the privilege of 
serving as mediators between the state and the individual.  The lawyer’s 
privileged position in society thus required lawyers not to abuse it for their 
benefit.  Therefore, lawyers were “to maintain the highest standards of 
ethical conduct.”77  Additionally, lawyers needed to be independent of the 
state to protect the right and dignity of their clients when the state exercised 
power.  That required the legal profession to regulate itself.  The 
“fundamental ethical principles” were the guide for the lawyer, who played 
various roles and engaged in difficult tasks that called for the exercise of 
sound judgment.78   
 
69. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969) (providing “Ethical 
Considerations” and “Disciplinary Rules” in each Canon). 
70. Id. at Canons 1, 8. 
71. Id. at Canon 3. 
72. Id. at Canons 4, 7. 
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The adoption of the Code without amendment by the House of 
Delegates was a harbinger of its general acceptance.79  States and state bar 
associations rapidly adopted the Code, and most made few, if any, 
changes.80  Yet, by mid-1977, the Code was so roundly criticized that the 
ABA created another special committee to draft what became the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (1983).81 
C. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) 
The initial approach of this second Special Commission on Evaluation of 
Ethical Standards (Kutak Commission) was to emphasize the public duties 
of the lawyer.  It intended to remind lawyers that law was a public 
profession.  Lawyers owed some duties to the public, in addition to the 
duties they owed their clients.  When the Model Rules were adopted by the 
ABA in 1983, the emphasis shifted to detailing the lawyer’s specific, rule-
based duties to clients.82  
The Kutak Commission scrapped the three-tiered structure of the Code 
for a set of rules stating minimum standards of lawyer conduct.  It did, 
however, follow the Code and include a Preamble.  Like the Code’s 
Preamble, the Preamble to the Rules discussed the principles animating the 
legal profession.  It began: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, 
is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”83  In this last 
role: 
[The lawyer] should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, 
the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession.  As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate 
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in 
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education.  In addition, a 
 
79. Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 68, at 389–92. 
80. Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 96 ANN. 
REP. A.B.A. 676, 676 (1971) (noting thirty-one states, eleven state bar associations, and the District of 
Columbia Bar had adopted Code); see id. 96 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 242, 243 (1971) (reporting most states 
adopted Code without making any changes). 
81. See, e.g., William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, BAR LEADER,  
Nov.–Dec. 1977, at 2–3 (discussing reasons, including failure of Code to work as desired, why Spann, 
as ABA president, created Kutak Commission to reassess the code and the substantive and procedural 
facets of legal ethics).  
82. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism, 
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 692 (2016) (discussing the history of the Kutak Commission). 
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble [1] (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020). 
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lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule 
of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional 
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
authority.84 
The Preamble did not create enforceable duties applicable to lawyers.  Only 
a violation of the rules could subject a lawyer to regulatory discipline.  Both 
the emphasis on rules and the changing economics of the private practice 
of law affected the legal profession’s thinking about broad-based (much less 
universally applicable) principles.  Lawyers predominantly looked at the 
rules in light of the lawyer’s specific duties and standards of conduct when 
representing clients.  At the forefront of those duties to clients was the duty 
of loyalty.  This narrower understanding of the lawyer’s responsibility was 
one reason why the debates on adding exceptions to the duty not to disclose 
client confidences were so hotly contested in the House of Delegates in 
2001 and 2003.85   
The extent to which a lawyer’s duty of loyalty prevented the disclosure of 
client confidences had been fiercely discussed when the Model Rules were 
debated in 1983.86  The changes proposed by the ABA’s Ethics 2000 
commission returned the issue to the House.  Even after the shock of 
Enron’s bankruptcy, the dissolution of the Big Five accounting firm Arthur 
Andersen, and the bankruptcies of several other high-flying stock market 
darlings, the representatives in the House of Delegates strongly disagreed 
with one another, as made clear in the narrowness of the votes.87  The 
fundamental nature of this dispute and others in the proposed Ethics 2000 
amendments may be why the ABA’s summary of the discussion in the 
House includes nine uses of the phrase “core values.”88  
 
84. Id. at Preamble [6]. 
85. See Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 37 
(2001) (providing the House debate from 2001); see also Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House 
of Delegates, 128:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 14–18 (2003) (providing the House debate from 2003). 
86. Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 289, 
295–99 (1983).  
87. See supra note 85; see also Ariens, supra note 5, at 295–300 (giving a timeline of events in the 
Appendix). 
88. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 36–39, 59 
(2001) (mentioning “core values” nine times in debate of Ethics 2000 proposed amendments). 
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III.    CORE VALUES 
A. Stirrings 
Lawyers did not use the phrase “core values” in relation to the practice 
of law or the role of the American legal profession when the Kutak 
Commission drafted the Model Rules between 1977 and 1983.  The ABA’s 
two-year study on the apparent decline in professionalism (and call for its 
renewal) in the mid-1980s urged lawyers to adopt the “goals” of “integrity, 
competence, fairness, independence, courage and a devotion to the public 
interest.”89  It did not discuss core values.  Neither did legal ethics writers.  
Charles Wolfram’s comprehensive Modern Legal Ethics (1986) begins his 
study of the lawyer’s duty to keep confidences by discussing “The 
Confidentiality Principle.”90  The American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, drafted between the mid-1980s and 
finally published in 2000, does not appear to use the phrase core values.91  
It is barely used in books covered in Google’s Ngram Viewer, though the 
number of references increase from nearly nothing to barely something 
between 1980 and 2020.92 
In legal writings, the phrase “core values” was used occasionally before 
1990 to discuss the essential meaning of particular provisions of the 
Constitution.  For example, in the 1968 case of Pickering v. Board 
of Education,93 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, wrote of “[t]he public interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance—the core value of the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . .”94  “Core values” was 
very rarely used to refer to the purpose of the work of lawyers in law review 
or bar journal articles before then.95  
 
89. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 111:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 369, 371, 418 (1986).  The 
report was also published at 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) and as a book.  COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, “. . . .  IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF 
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986). 
90. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1, at 242 (1986). 
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
92. Search for “Principles, Values, Core Values”, GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/ [https://perma.cc/EL5W-HEW5]. 
93. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
94. Id. at 573. 
95. The exception to this is James Y. Preston, The President’s Message, N.C. ST. BAR Q., Summer 
1988, at 2 (discussing “the importance of certain core values for the legal profession—values like 
justice, truth and service—as being essential to the survival of the profession and of its practitioners”); 
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The change began in a 1990 essay by Geoffrey Hazard96 on The Future of 
Legal Ethics.97  Hazard was the most well-known legal ethics scholar of this 
time.  He served as Reporter to the Kutak Commission from 1978 to 
1983.98  In 1984, he became ALI Director, and under his leadership the ALI 
began its Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers project.99  Hazard’s 
essay argued that the “basic ethical rules of representation” of clients had 
remained remarkably stable for two centuries.100  When a lawyer represents 
a client, “[t]he rules enforce three core values: loyalty, confidentiality, and 
candor to the court.”101  The first two core values “legitimate” the lawyer’s 
representation of the client, and the last “legitimates the bar’s affiliation with 
the judiciary.”102 
Hazard did not further explain.  Thus, it is unclear why Hazard 
distinguished confidentiality from loyalty, for a lawyer keeps a client’s (and 
former client’s) confidences to demonstrate the lawyer’s loyalty to the client.  
It is also unclear whether Hazard’s understanding of core values refers to 
the values of the legal profession, the values held by some subset of lawyers 
(litigators?), an individual lawyer’s beliefs, or as values clients desire their 
lawyers to possess.  Hazard’s description of the profession’s core values was 
largely ignored until the late 1990s, when the Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice adopted both the phrase and Hazard’s core values 
of loyalty and confidentiality.103  
 
see also Robert G. Baynes, The President’s Message, N.C. ST. BAR Q., Fall 1988, at 2 (noting his 
predecessor’s (Preston’s) emphasis on core values that all lawyers accept, but not naming such values).  
96. Hazard was the reporter for the Kutak Commission that drafted the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the director of the American Law Institute when it initiated (and throughout) 
its Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers project, co-author of The Law of Lawyering (GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed., 2014)), co-author of a popular casebook 
on legal ethics, and the preeminent legal ethics authority of his time.  See Stephen Gillers, Hazard, 
Geoffrey C., Jr., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 259 (Roger K. 
Newman ed., 2009); see also In Memoriam: Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A.L.I. REP., Spring 2018, at 1, 4–5 
(honoring Hazard). 
97. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1246 (1991). 
98. See supra note 96. 
99. See supra note 96. 
100. Hazard, supra note 97, at 1246. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. 
103. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 
1092–93 (2000) (noting idea of core values and listing confidentiality, loyalty, and competence and 
adding the negative core value of “being as nasty as we can be”).  
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B. The MacCrate Report and Fundamental Values 
In 1992, the Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 
issued the Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing 
the Gap, known as the MacCrate Report.104  Its mission was to identify ways 
in which law schools and the legal profession could work together to ease 
the transition of law students to the practice of law.  To do so, the Task 
Force recognized that “it was not possible to consider how to ‘bridge’ or 
‘narrow’ the alleged ‘gap’ between law schools and the practicing bar without 
first identifying the fundamental skills and values that every lawyer should 
acquire” before practicing law.105  It seconded this idea by declaring, at its 
outset, “the law has remained a single profession identified with a perceived 
common body of learning, skills and values.”106  The Task Force 
acknowledged its inability to draft “a comprehensive statement of skills and 
values that all members of the profession would—or could reasonably be 
expected to—accept as definitive.”107  Even so, it was useful for the 
progress of the American legal profession to begin the process.108  In 
addition to ten fundamental lawyering skills, the MacCrate Report listed four 
“[f]undamental [v]alues of the [p]rofession”: 1) “Provision of Competent 
Representation; 2) ”Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness and Morality”; 
3) “Striving to Improve the Profession”; and 4) “Professional Self-
Development.”109 
These “fundamental values” do not overlap the three “core values” listed 
by Hazard.  Additionally, the MacCrate Report’s four fundamental values 
substantially overlap one another.  The duty to provide competent 
representation has much in common with the duty to engage in professional 
self-development.  The value of striving to promote justice overlaps with all 
of the other values.  Incompetently representing a client is a form of injustice 
and demonstrates a failure to develop one’s professional abilities.  It also 
detracts from the capacity of legal institutions to do justice. 
 
104. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) 
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].  Robert MacCrate served as the chair of the task force.  Id. at v. 
105. Id. at 7. 
106. Id. at 11. 
107. Id. at 123. 
108. See id. at 124 (describing the benefits of composing a statement regarding the “nature of 
the skills and values that are central to the role and functioning of lawyers in practice”). 
109. Id. at 140–41, 207–21 (offering detailed statements of four fundamental values). 
  
198 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:180 
Two notable articles—further described below—discussed core values of 
the American legal profession in the mid-1990s, neither of which made any 
reference to Hazard.  Both were concerned with the ongoing issue 
of what lawyer professionalism meant, especially in a market-driven legal 
profession.  In a 1995 speech on professionalism, former 
ABA President George Bushnell discussed the “core values . . . [of] 
ensuring access to justice for all persons and defending the sanctity of our 
Constitution . . . .”110  Both were threatened by Congress, the former by 
attacks on legal services for the poor, and the latter by proposals to amend 
the Constitution.111  The latter threats included efforts to overturn Supreme 
Court precedents protecting the right to burn an American flag and allowing 
public schools to require students to pray.112  Such threats to the First 
Amendment rights to speech and religion would “cripple our freedoms and 
subject us all to a more authoritarian government.”113 
A 1994 essay in the ABA publication, Business Law Today, was titled 
Reclaiming Our Core Values.114  Author Ronald Kessel, the managing partner 
of Palmer and Dodge, a large Boston firm, sought a renewed sense of 
professional community.  Too often, law firms had fallen into the trap of 
valuing the “limited” currency of “dollars and billable hours.”115  This made 
the practice of law more like work in a nineteenth century sweatshop than a 
professional endeavor.  Law firms would be well served by a “revitalized 
institutional commitment to professional values and the professional 
growth of its lawyers.”116  Kessel did not define the contours of “core” or 
“professional” values; for him, the heart of the matter was the imbalance 
caused lawyers by a focus on monetary rewards.   
C. Core Values and Lawyer Ethics, 1997–2003 
In 1997, ABA President Jerome Shestak dedicated his year of service to 
fulfilling the profession’s “fundamental professional values,”117 building on 
 
110. George E. Bushnell, Jr., Francis X. Riley Lecture on Professionalism, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1995). 
111. Id. at 4–5.  
112. Id. at 5–6. 
113. Id. at 6. 
114. Ronald H. Kessel, Reclaiming Our Core Values, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 6. 
115. Id. at 9. 
116. Id.  
117. Jerome J. Shestack, Putting Our Professional Values to Work, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 8; see 
also Jerome J. Shestack, Defining Our Calling, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 8, 8 (calling for lawyers to 
“enhance[] our professionalism”). 
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the recommendations made in the MacCrate Report.  In his inaugural 
speech, he argued, “rapid changes in the profession and technology make a 
comprehensive study and review necessary to take the legal profession into 
the next century.”118  He therefore urged the creation of a Commission on 
Evaluation of Professional Standards (Ethics 2000).119  Shestak returned to 
this theme in this swan song.  Shestak asked ABA members to “commit to 
the essential values and conduct that make a lawyer worthy of being called 
a professional”; he did not examine in detail which values were essential or 
fundamental.120  
Shestak’s successor, Philip Anderson, began his term by noting the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants was readying adoption 
of its vision statement, which had “a distinctly market-oriented bent.”121  
Further, this vision statement perceived growth not in the areas of taxation 
and accounting, work traditionally done by accountants, but in “consulting 
services, including legal services.”122  Anderson also noted that four of the 
five largest employers of lawyers were accounting firms.123  The Big Five 
accounting firms looked ready to enter the “legal consulting” market,124 in 
effect, the practice of law.  This possibility was a threat to those large firms 
that competed with the Big Five.  Anderson decided to create a Commission 
on Multidisciplinary Practice.125  It was to recommend whether 
organizations in which both legal and other services were offered, and which 
were owned by lawyers and other nonlawyer service providers, should be 
permitted in the Rules of Professional Conduct.126  If so, this would alter 
or abolish Rule 5.4(b)’s ban on nonlawyer ownership of entities in which 
the practice of law occurred.  It was given less than a year to report back.  
 
118. James Podgers, Model Rules Get the Once-Over, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 90, 90 (quoting 
Shestack). 
119. Id.  The formal name of the Commission was Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and popularly known as the Ethics 2000 Commission.  See id. (using the names 
interchangeably).  
120. Jerome J. Shestak, Taking Professionalism Seriously, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 70, 70. 
121. Philip S. Anderson, We All Must Be Accountable, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 6, 6. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. John Gibeaut & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze: Commission Appointed to Assess Threat from 
Accountants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 88, 88 (noting the creation of a commission in response to efforts 
by accounting firms to enter markets long thought by lawyers to be theirs alone). 
125. Id. 
126. See id. (describing the issue the commission would assess and indicating it would 
recommend a response to the House of Delegates). 
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The Multidisciplinary Practice Commission met its deadline.  Its Report 
favored amending Model Rule 5.4 to permit lawyers and nonlawyers jointly 
to own an MDP.127  The Commission recommended this change on the 
condition that the bar “protect its core values, independence of professional 
judgment, protection of confidential client information, and loyalty to the 
client through the avoidance of conflicts of interest . . . .”128  The last two, 
of course, were values listed by Hazard in his 1990 essay;129 Hazard was a 
member of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.130  
Independence of professional judgment, not Hazard’s “candor to the 
court,” was the Commission’s third core value.131  It seems likely that listing 
this core value was more a consequence of the issue before the Commission 
than an effort to displace candor as a core value.   
Most states created similar commissions.132  The Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York (City Bar) was one.  The City Bar responded 
favorably to the initial report of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice in support of amending the Model Rules, though it added more 
core values:  
MDPs should be permitted, but only under a regime that requires MDPs to 
respect and preserve the core values of the legal profession—independence 
of judgment, loyalty to the client, preservation of confidences, competence, 
avoiding improper solicitation, and support for pro bono legal services and 
improving the legal system.133  
 
127. Report, supra note 21, at 223; see also Debra Baker, View from the Other Side, A.B.A. J., 
Apr. 1999, at 83, 83 (quoting Lawrence Fox at the February 1999 ABA Midyear Meeting in opposition 
to MDPs: “The whole notion that all of our core values shall be destroyed sends shivers through 
me . . . ”). 
128. Report, supra note 21, at 223.  The report continues and gives a detailed description of itself.  
Id. at 225–32 (discussing the report in detail). 
129. See supra notes 96–97, 101 (describing Hazard’s 1990 essay).  
130. Report, supra note 21, at 232 (listing members). 
131. Id. at 223. 
132. George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis 
of Inter-Professional Competition, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 857 n.21 (2006) (noting “forty-four states and 
the District of Columbia” created commissions on the subject). 
133. Statement of Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, 54 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 585, 596 
(1999).  The list is written slightly differently by its Executive Committee.  Id. at 589 (including 
“decision-making” as part of independence of judgment and adding “avoidance of conflicts of interest” 
to the core value of loyalty to the client, and “maintaining the independence and integrity of the judicial 
system” to the last duty noted). 
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The Florida Bar issued a report recommending the ABA not act on the 
Commission’s recommendation until further study was completed and 
demonstrated that this change would not adversely affect the values of 
lawyer independence and the duty of client loyalty.  It argued the 
Commission had not thoroughly evaluated whether the public understood 
and supported this change to “a fundamental value of the independence of 
the profession.”134  The ABA agreed to the delay.  
The Commission returned with the same recommendation in 2000.135  It 
again made its recommendation with the proviso that the profession protect 
the public interest and the “core values of the legal profession.”136  It added 
two core values, “competence, . . . and pro bono publico obligations,” to the 
three listed in its report the previous year.137  It also tartly informed the 
House of Delegates that the study proposed by the Florida Bar was 
infeasible.138 
The Commission’s recommendation triggered a disagreement in the 
House of Delegates about who better understood and interpreted the core 
values of the legal profession.139  Those supporting the Commission’s 
recommendation lost by a nearly 3–1 margin.140  Its recommendation was 
displaced by a resolution reaffirming the majority’s understanding of core 
values.  The House resolved that each jurisdiction “implement the following 
principles and preserve the core values of the legal profession.”141  The six 
core values the House listed were: 1) a “duty of undivided loyalty to the 
 
134. Report of the Florida Bar, 124:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 753, 754 (1999). 
135. Multidisciplinary Report, supra note 25, at 183; see also Report, supra note 21, at 223–25 
(mentioning “core values” nine times in the 2000 debate on multidisciplinary firms); Fox, supra note 29, 
at 547–48 (alluding to the Commission’s recommendation and its alleged connection to protecting core 
values).  The MacCrate Report is discussed in “Professionalism and the Lawyer’s Role,” above.  
Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 27, at 26 (indicating MacCrate led 
effort in the House of Delegates to keep the ABA ethics rules ban on multidisciplinary firms). 
136. Multidisciplinary Report, supra note 25, at 183. 
137. Id. at 183.  The Commission noted: “It is undeniable that competence is a core value of 
the profession and the Commission’s original recommendation should have so identified it.”  Id. at 188.  
On pro bono, it declared: “Through recognizing that pro bono service is not mandatory, the 
Commission nevertheless believes it is a core value of the legal profession.”  Id. at 190. 
138. Id. at 192–93. 
139. See Report of the Illinois Bar Association Presented Jointly with the New Jersey State Bar Association, 
125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 343, 343, 345 (2000) (offering a “statement of principles” that included four 
“core values”: undivided loyalty to clients, competence, keeping client confidences inviolate, and duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest with a client); see also id. at 345 (referencing the MacCrate report). 
140. See John Gibeaut, ‘It’s a Done Deal’: House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 2000, at 92, 92 (noting the vote against the proposal was 314–106). 
141. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 24 (2000). 
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client”; 2) a “duty competently to exercise independent legal judgment” on 
a client’s behalf; 3) a duty to keep client confidences inviolate; 4) a duty to 
avoid a conflict of interest with a client; 5) a duty to “maintain a single 
profession of law with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special 
responsibilit[ies] for the quality of justice; and” 6) a “duty to promote access 
to justice.”142  
A leader in the House who rejected MDPs was Robert MacCrate, a 
former ABA president for whom the MacCrate Report was named.  As a 
former president, MacCrate was permitted to make a report to delegates 
opposing the Commission’s recommendation.143  He noted the work of the 
Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation of 
the New York State Bar Association, which he served as chairperson.144  Its 
report was titled, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession.145  
The committee listed seven core values.  Four were fiduciary duties owed to 
clients (confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, independent judgment, 
and competence), and three were duties “arising” from the lawyer’s role in 
the adversary and governmental systems (advocacy, access to legal services, 
and “[t]he independent legal profession and the rule of law”).146 
The MDP debate in the ABA and in state bar associations had generated 
a broad discussion of the contours of the legal profession’s core values.  The 
June 2000 issue of the Minnesota Law Review (that is, after the ABA’s 1999 
delay and before its reconsideration of MDPs in 2000) published articles 
from a symposium on multidisciplinary practice, core values, and the future 
of the legal profession.  One contribution looked closely at the core values 
issue, similarly to the New York State Bar Association.  The authors asked, 
what were the profession’s core values from the perspectives of 1) clients, 
and 2) society?147  They listed several core values from each perspective.  
To effectuate the client’s interests, a lawyer had to be competent, truthful 
 
142. Id.  Promoting access to justice was one of Bushnell’s core values, as discussed in his 1995 
lecture.  See supra note 110. 
143. Report of Robert MacCrate, Former President, 125:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 603 (2000). 
144. Id. at 604.   
145. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE L. GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE & OPERATION, N.Y. STATE 
BAR ASS’N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (2000), 
https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2020/01/MACRATEREPORTAccessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2GA4-GJ83]. 
146. Id. at 309–24. 
147. James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical” Proposal to 
Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1186 (2000).  
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and honest, keep client confidences, and exercise independent judgment for 
the benefit of the client.148  Regarding this last core value, a lawyer was 
unable to exercise independent judgment if there existed a conflict of 
interest with the client.149  To meet society’s interests, the lawyer needs to 
abide by the law, speak candidly and truthfully to any tribunal, speak 
truthfully to adversaries and third parties, provide access to the system of 
justice, and “work to improve the system of justice.”150 
The 2003 House of Delegates debate whether to add two exceptions to 
Rule 1.6 protecting client confidences brought more heat than light to the 
core values question.  The duty to keep “inviolate the confidence, and at 
every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients” had long 
been one of the “duties specifically enjoined by law on attorneys,” as 
Thomas Goode Jones wrote in 1887.151  This inviolate duty was 
accompanied by the common law crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege.  This exception applied when a lawyer’s services were used 
to permit a person to commit what the client knew or reasonably should 
have known was a crime or fraud.152  “Inviolate” may not have been quite 
the right word. 
At the end of these two debates, the following had been nominated as 
professional core values: 
•  Competence, including a “duty competently to exercise 
independent legal judgment” on a client’s behalf; 
•  Confidentiality, sometimes referred to as the duty to keep 
confidences “inviolate”; 
•  Undivided loyalty to client, sometimes reflected in a duty to avoid 
any conflict of interest with the client; 
 
148. Id. at 1187. 
149. Id. at 1187–88. 
150. Id. at 1188–89. 
151. Jones, supra note 40,  at 46–47 (listing, as the fourth duty of seven, to “maintain inviolate 
the confidence, and at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients”); see ABA Code 
of Ethics, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 567, 585 (1908) (listing as the fifth oath provision: “I will maintain the 
confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client . . . ”). 
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 82 (AM. L. INST. 2000), 
which differs slightly from proposed, but rejected, FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(1) (1975) (“[S]ervices of the 
lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud . . . .”). 
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•  A duty to exercise “independent judgment” on behalf of the client; 
•  A duty to be truthful and honest with one’s clients; 
•  Avoiding improper solicitation; 
•  Candor to the court, also stated as a duty to speak candidly and 
truthfully to any tribunal; 
•  A duty of advocacy arising from the lawyer’s role in the adversary 
system; 
•  Professional self-development; 
•  Providing pro bono publico services; 
•  Striving to promote justice, fairness and morality;  
•  Contributing to the profession’s fulfillment of its responsibility to 
enhance the capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice;  
•  A “duty to promote access to justice” or to “provide” access to the 
system of justice; 
•  A duty to work to improve the system of justice; 
•  A duty to maintain “a single profession of law with responsibilities 
as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a 
public citizen having special responsibilit[ies] for the quality of 
justice”;  
•  A duty to promote access to legal services;  
•  A duty to maintain the independent legal profession and the rule of 
law; and 
•  A duty to abide by the law.153 
There was pushback.  Professor Nathan Crystal closely assessed four of 
the six core values listed in the ABA’s resolution in 2000 and found them 
wanting.  This list had “rhetorical appeal but is fundamentally 
misleading.”154  Additionally, “reliance on the core values of the 
 
153. See, e.g., supra notes 141–52 and accompanying text (describing the debates and core values 
nominated during the debates).  
154. Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748 (2001). 
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profession” harms those of moderate means in need of legal services.155  
The ABA ignored his critical, well-reasoned analysis. 
D. Core Values and the ABA, 2000–2010 
The ABA Journal publishes a column from its president in each issue.  
Most reflect the president’s particular goals or the ABA’s mission.  From 
2000 through 2010, many ABA presidents favorably discussed the 
importance of protecting and enhancing the legal profession’s core values 
in one or more monthly columns.156  Nearly all did so without referring to 
any particular core values.  One exception was H. Thomas Wells, Jr., who 
served as president from 2008–2009.  Wells’s objective as president was to 
foster four core values that “all lawyers share”: “access to justice, 
independence of the bar and judiciary, diversity and the rule of law.”157  All 
concerned institutional core values, an expected focus.  The core value of 
“diversity” was the only one of these four core values new to the list. 
Wells included diversity in response to the decision of the ABA House of 
Delegates to “reform[] its goals and mission” in 2008.158  Its mission was 
 
155. Id.  
156. See Carolyn B. Lamm, Help Spread the Word: Inform Your Colleagues of Benefits and Public Service 
Aspects of ABA Membership, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2009, at 9, 9 (reflecting on how ABA members serve the 
profession and the public); Next in Line: Michael Greco Begins His Term as ABA President-Elect, A.B.A. J., 
Oct. 2004, at 76, 76 (quoting new president, Michael Greco); Dennis W. Archer, Times Have Changed: 
Join My Family, Our ABA Family in Improving the Justice System and the World, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 8, 8 
(describing a core value he resolved to focus on); Alfred P. Carlton Jr., Of Time and Independence: 
After 9-11 and the Business Debacles of Recent History, Our Country Needs Us, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 10, 10 
(emphasizing the importance of “hold[ing] fast to the core values” of the legal profession); 
Martha W. Barnett, Professionalism Pays, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 10, 10 (describing how law firms 
should use the values of “[c]haracter, [c]ompetence and [c]ommitment” to guide their operations); 
William G. Paul, ABA—A Home for All Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 8, 8 (“[A]ll lawyers share core 
values and professional obligations, and have a duty to do the work of the profession.”); 
William G. Paul, A Vision for Our Profession, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 8, 8 (“[O]ur core values [should] 
never change because they set us apart as a profession and are critical to the preservation of our free 
society.”). 
157. Wells, supra note 30, at 9; H. Thomas Wells Jr., Common Core Values, BAR LEADER, 
Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 16, 16. 
158. See COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PRO., AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III 
REPORT: THE STATE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 
(2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity-portal/2011r_e_ 
goal3_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDW-NWUG] (discussing the history of the ABA’s reforming 
its mission and goals); AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III REPORT 2020: THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF 
THE ABA’S LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERS 5 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/diversity-inclusion-center/2020_goal_iii_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3AV-
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to “serve equally our members, our profession and the public by defending 
liberty and delivering justice as the national representative of the legal 
profession.”159  The four goals adopted to meet this mission were: serve 
our members, improve our profession, “[e]liminate [b]ias and [e]nhance 
[d]iversity,” and “[a]dvance the [r]ule of [l]aw.”160  The two objectives of 
diversity (Goal III) were: “[p]romote full and equal participation in the 
association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons,” and 
“[e]liminate bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”161 
The extent to which these goals were to inform other decisions of the 
House of Delegates was uncertain.  At the February 2010 ABA Midyear 
Meeting, the House adopted a recommendation that the ABA examine how 
third parties (such as U.S. News & World Report) ranked law firms (a new 
project) and law schools (an old project).162  The initial recommendation 
suggested lawyers “consider whether such rankings promote diversity, pro 
bono activities and other ‘core values’ of the profession.”163  These 
particular considerations were dropped from the resolution by a vote of  
203–183.164 
Another measure of the importance of core values language in the ABA 
was its reaffirmation in 2007 of the core values of pro bono publico work and 
the independence of the bar from the government.  In January 2007, a senior 
Department of Defense official encouraged general counsel at Fortune 500 
companies to jettison law firms and lawyers who also represented alleged 
terrorists and Guantanamo detainees on a pro bono basis.165  The 
organized bar and the House of Delegates responded immediately.  A group 
of thirty bar associations and ABA sections and committees proposed five 
resolutions condemning this attack on lawyers at the ABA’s February 2007 
meeting.166  The first resolution affirmed the ABA’s “commitment to the 
 
TBFH] (describing how, “[i]n 2008, the House of Delegates voted to revise the Association’s goals to 
ensure that the rights of other underrepresented groups could be addressed”). 
159. ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 31.  
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Proceedings of the 2010 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 135:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1,  
40–44 (2010). 
163. Edward A. Adams, Rankings to Get ABA Review, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2010, at 66, 66. 
164. Id. 
165. See James Podgers, Engaged from the Start, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2007, at 64, 66 (commenting on 
remarks made by a “senior official at the Pentagon” to the corporations); see Lawrence J. Fox,  
The ABA—A Beacon for Our Clients, 2007 PRO. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 9, 15 (2007) (discussing event). 
166. See Report of the New York State Bar Association et al., 132:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 479, 479–81 
(2007) (listing thirty sponsors of the resolutions) [hereinafter NYSBA Report]. 
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core values of the legal profession, including commitment to pro bono 
provision of legal services to those in need and the commitment to the 
independence of the profession, provided that this does not negate existing 
ABA policy regarding any governmental obligation to provide counsel.”167  
The four other resolutions were also adopted after modest amendments.  
They included praise for those courageous lawyers willing to “provide pro 
bono legal services to disfavored individuals and groups.”168  The House 
also condemned “any governmental attack on the independence of the 
profession that encourages clients to exert improper influence over their 
lawyers’ choice of other clients, or to penalize lawyers for representing 
unpopular or controversial clients.”169  As the chair of the ABA Criminal 
Justice Section reminded his readers: “The unique and important role of an 
independent bar in protecting and defending liberty is more, not less, 
important than ever before.”170  Those lawyers fighting “for the rights of 
the ‘worst of the worst[]’ . . . demonstrated fidelity to the rule of law, the 
Constitution of the United States, and fundamental principles of 
international law.”171 
E. Ethics 20/20 and Core Values, 2009–2012 
In 2009, Carolyn Lamm followed Wells as ABA president.  Like Shestak 
(and others) before her, she argued a review of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct was necessary to “keep pace with societal change” 
and with the “accelerating pace of technological innovation.”172  She 
created an Ethics 20/20 Commission to recommend changes, if any, to the 
Model Rules. 
 
167. Id. at 480; Proceedings of the 2007 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 132:1 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 1, 22–23 (2007). 
168. NYSBA Report, supra note 166, at 480.  Proceedings of the 2007 Midyear Meeting of the House of 
Delegates, supra note 167, at 23. 
169. NYSBA Report, supra note 166, at 481. 
170. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Importance of an Independent Bar, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2008, at 1, 
20. 
171. Id. at 22. 
172. See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE 1–2 
(Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/pre 
liminary_issues_outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CCG-VKJF] (indicating “Lamm created the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20” to assess the Model Rules in light of modern developments); Carolyn 
Lamm, Now More than Ever: ABA Will Continue Providing Guidance, Delivering Benefits to Boost the Profession, 
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 9, 9 (“We need to review our system of legal governance and ethical regulations 
to keep up with a changing world.”). 
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The Ethics 20/20 Commission possessed the authority to undertake a 
“plenary review and assessment of the Model Rules” in light of these 
changes.173  The Commission was to “be guided by three principles: 
protecting the public [interest], preserving core professional values of the 
American legal profession [(otherwise left undefined)], and maintaining a 
strong, independent, and self-regulating profession.”174  Its preliminary 
outline focused on the impact of state regulation of lawyers engaged in the 
multijurisdictional practice of law, the effect of changes in technology on 
the globalization of the practice of law, and ethics issues affected by 
technology.175 
In a December 2, 2011 memorandum and report, Ethics 20/20 
announced its decision to continue the ban on most types of 
multidisciplinary practice structures, now referred to as “alternative law 
practice structures” (ALPS).176  The Commission left open the possibility 
of a very “limited form of . . . nonlawyer ownership” in a law firm.177  The 
Commission declared this possibility was “more restrictive than” the type 
of (restrictive) nonlawyer ownership the District of Columbia had permitted 
for over twenty years.178  The mere possibility of an ALPS was sufficient 
to rouse the opposition.  The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), joined 
by other associations, filed a resolution asking the House to re-affirm its 
2000 decision to ban any form of multidisciplinary practice.179  
 
173. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 172, at 1–2. 
174. Id. at 2. 
175. See generally id. (outlining the issues).  
176. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (state, loc., specialty & int’l), Law Schools, & 
Individuals 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin 
istrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCT5-7C 
6U]. 
177. Id. at 2. 
178. Id.; see Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/standingcommitteeonprofessionalism2/resour
ces/ethics2020hompeage/ [https://perma.cc/ND69-P6LX] (“The Commission already has ruled out 
certain forms of nonlawyer ownership that currently exist in other countries.  In particular, the 
Commission rejected: (a) publicly traded law firms, (b) outside nonlawyer investment or ownership in 
law firms, and (c) multidisciplinary practices (i.e., law firms that offer both legal and non-legal services 
separately in a single entity).  This Discussion Draft relates to a very limited form of nonlawyer 
ownership in a law firm akin to, but more restrictive than, that which has been permitted for 21 years 
in the District of Columbia.”). 
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ISBA President John Thies raised the stakes: “[T]his is about defending the 
core values of our profession against the encroachment of non-lawyers—to 
the detriment of clients.  It’s gratifying that so many other states are lining 
up behind us, and I expect this to continue as we approach the ABA meeting 
in August.”180  Even after Ethics 20/20 decided in April to make no 
proposal permitting lawyers to form any ALPS in which legal services would 
be provided,181 the ISBA continued to press its resolution in August.  
Agreeing were nine general counsel of large corporations.  They declared, 
“allowing any form of non-lawyer ownership of law firms will harm the core 
values of the American legal profession.”182  These counsel explicitly 
referred to the core values adopted in 2000.183  Although the ISBA’s 
resolution was formally postponed rather than adopted, it won.  No change 
was made. And the reason appeared to be the defense of the profession’s 
“core values.”184  Of course, the co-chairs of Ethics 20/20 had pledged to 
maintain the core values of the profession as one of its principles.  Aligning 
these competing claims of core values was becoming less likely. 
 
ma.cc/BD7Z-JD2F] (stating the “resolution would reaffirm certain core principles and values of the 
legal profession” that the House adopted in 2000). 
180. Chris Bonjean, ISBA Submits Resolution Regarding ABA’s Ethics 20/20, ILL. ST. BAR ASS’N 
(June 20, 2012), https://www.isba.org/barnews/2012/06/20/isba-submits-resolution-regarding-ab 
as-ethics-2020 [https://perma.cc/6QHS-TZBD ] (quoting Thies). 
181. James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 Commission Shelves Nonlawyer Ownership, Focuses on 
Other Proposals, A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 27, 27, 29; see Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael 
Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (state, loc., 
specialty & int’l), Law Schools, & Individuals 7 (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111228_summary_of_ethics_20_20_commissi
on_actions_december_2011_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58H-Y86B] (indicating the Commission 
rejected such proposals). 
182. Email from Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, Gen. Couns. & Sec’y, Cisco Sys., Inc. 




183. Id. at 2. 
184. See James E. Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Successfully Achieved Its Mission: It “Protected, Preserved, 
and Maintained”, 47 AKRON L. REV. 149, 157–58 (2014) (discussing the controversy and Thies’s 
invocation of the profession’s “core values”); see also Proceedings of the 2012 Annual Meeting of the House of 
Delegates, 137:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 6 (2012) (postponing consideration of Resolution 10A). 
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IV.    MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(G) 
A. History of Anti-Discrimination Ethics Proposals, 1992–2013 
Model Rule 8.4(g) went from idea to adoption in less than two years’ time, 
and from first to final (fifth) version in just over a year.  This is quick in 
ABA policymaking.  Its origins, and the interest of many in the ABA to add 
some type of anti-discrimination provision in the Model Rules, began much 
earlier. 
The 1992 MacCrate Report’s second fundamental professional value was 
to strive “to [p]romote [j]ustice, [f]airness, and [m]orality.”185  In its 
Commentary on this value, the Report discussed how important it was for 
lawyers to accord “appropriate dignity and respect to all people with whom 
one interacts in a professional capacity.”186  More specifically, that duty 
“necessarily includes refraining from sexual harassment and from any form 
of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation, age, or disability, in one’s professional interactions with clients, 
witnesses, support staff, and other individuals.”187  It cited New York and 
Minnesota lawyer ethics provisions in support of its conclusion; the latter, 
adopted in 1989, stated, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to . . . harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, 
national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection 
with a lawyer’s professional activities.”188 
In 1992, the ABA’s Task Force on Minorities and the Justice System 
issued its report, Achieving Justice in a Diverse America.189  One suggestion of 
the Task Force was that the Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility draft a rule of professional conduct making it misconduct to 
engage in certain types of discriminatory behavior.190  At the February 1994 
Midyear Meeting of the ABA, the Committee recommended adding new 
paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4.191  Its recommendation made it 
misconduct for a lawyer, “in the course of representing a client,” to 
 
185. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 104, at 140. 
186. Id. at 214. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. (quoting MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1989)). 
189. TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES & THE JUST. SYS., AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN 
A DIVERSE AMERICA (1992). 
190. Id. at 26. 
191. Report No. 3 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 119:1 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 106, 106 (1994) [hereinafter Report No. 3]. 
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“knowingly manifest by words or conduct . . . bias or prejudice based upon 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-
economic status.”192  The Committee also proposed a new comment that 
concluded “[d]iscriminatory conduct . . . generally viewed as unacceptable 
manifests a lack of respect for the law and undermines a lawyer’s 
professionalism.”193  
The Committee’s proposal closely tracked Canon 3B(6) of the ABA’s 
1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon 3B(6) mandated a judge to 
“require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from 
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic 
status,” toward any person connected with the litigation.194  (Canon 3B(5) 
required the same of the judge in the performance of judicial duties.)195  
Though the Committee did not appear to break much new ground, given 
its reliance on language found in an existing Canon of Judicial Conduct, the 
recommendation was withdrawn before discussion in the hope that a 
proposal “commanding general support” could be offered the following 
year.196  The Young Lawyers Division (YLD) had offered its own 
paragraph (g) at the same meeting, which was also withdrawn.  The YLD 
proposal was both slightly narrower and significantly broader than the 
Committee’s.  Its proposal was narrower in the activities it proscribed.  Only 
those actions that constituted a “discriminatory act prohibited by law” or 
conduct that harassed a person based on race, gender and other attributes 
was misconduct.197  It was broader because it applied to “discrimination or 
harassment . . . in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities,” not 
 
192. Id.  
193. Id.; ARTHUR H. GARWIN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2013, at 855 (2013). 
194. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004); See Report No. 3, 
supra note 191, at 109 (quoting Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(6): “A judge shall require 
lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or 
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-
economic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.”); Canon 3B(6) is now found, as slightly 
amended, in MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (adding “or 
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to” after “prejudice,” and 
adding ethnicity, marital status, gender, and political affiliation to the list of attributes). 
195. Canon 3B(5) used the same language and created the same duty as applied to the judges 
themselves.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5). 
196. Proceedings of the 1994 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 119:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 18 
(1994). 
197. Report No. 1 of the Young Lawyers Division, 119:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 353, 353 (1994). 
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merely when representing a client.198  It was also broader than the 
Committee’s proposal because it omitted any exceptions.  The Committee 
had included exceptions relating to “a lawyer’s confidential communications 
to a client” and when engaged in “legitimate advocacy.”199   
The hope for a revised paragraph (g) in time for the February 1995 
meeting went unrealized, due to a change in view by the Committee.200  It 
decided a “policy statement” was preferable to a rule of professional 
conduct, and this halfway proposition was both acceded to by the YLD and 
adopted by the House at its August 1995 meeting.201  The YLD officially 
proposed a resolution condemning discrimination by lawyers, which it 
recognized as “aspirational.”202  This policy statement, the ABA Resolution 
Against Bias and Prejudice, consisted of five parts.203  The first part meshed 
the previously withdrawn proposals of the YLD and the Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility.  As amended, it  
condemns the manifestation by lawyers in the course of their professional 
activities, by words or conduct, of bias or prejudice against clients, opposing 
parties and their counsel, other litigants, witnesses, judges and court 
personnel, jurors and others, based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status, unless such words 
or conduct are otherwise permissible as legitimate advocacy on behalf of a 
client or a cause.204 
 
198. Id. 
199. Compare id. (providing a draft rule that did not include exceptions), with Report No. 3, supra 
note 191, at 106 (providing a draft rule including exceptions). 
200. See Report No. 1 of the Criminal Justice Section, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 207, 210 (1998) 
[hereinafter Criminal Justice Section] (recounting the history of recommended amendments to Model 
Rule 8.4 and noting “the Standing Committee subsequently shifted its position, instead favoring a 
policy statement over a rule”). 
201. Id. 
202. Report No. 3 of the Young Lawyers Division, 120:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 445, 445 (1995); see also 
Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, 120:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 2, 61 (1995) (revising and 
approving the “aspirational” policy statement); GARWIN, supra note 193, at 856 (discussing the 1995 
policy statement). 
203. See Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, supra note 202, at 61–62 (providing 
the text of the resolution).   
204. Id. at 61.  The other provisions condemned 1) “discrimination by lawyers in the 
management or operation of a law practice,” and 2) threatening, harassing, or intimidating others in 
any setting, not merely doing so with some connection to the practice of law; and 3) discouraged 
lawyers from joining organizations that engaged in “invidious discrimination” regarding the 
“aforementioned categories;” and 4) encouraged “affirmative steps such as continuing education . . . 
to discourage the speech and conduct described above.”  Id. at 61–62. 
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This policy statement generally accepted the broader reach of both the YLD 
and Committee’s proposals.  It followed the Committee in applying to 
“words or conduct” that demonstrated “bias or prejudice,” not merely “a 
discriminatory act prohibited by law” or harassment.205  It adopted the 
broader YLD proposal by condemning acts of lawyers “in the course of 
their professional activities,” not the subset of activities “in the course of 
representing a client,” as the Committee proposed.206  It was slightly 
narrower than YLD’s 1994 proposal in allowing an exception for “legitimate 
advocacy” for client or cause, but did not include the Committee’s other 
exception, confidential communications to a client.207 
Three years later, the Criminal Justice Section proposed adding a 
paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4, consisting of two subsections.208  This 
relatively narrow proposal applied only “in the course of representing a 
client,” only to a “verbal or physical discriminatory act, on account of race, 
ethnicity, or gender,” and only when such conduct was directed at those 
connected with the litigation, such as other litigants and witnesses.209  The 
proposal was divided into two sections, applying 1) if the lawyer intended 
to abuse persons or gain a tactical advantage, or 2) “if such conduct 
constitutes harassment.”210  The Section also proposed adding five 
Comments.  Its proposed Comment [8] stated:  
[The rule excludes] a lawyer’s advocating the racist, sexist, or otherwise 
discriminatory views of a client, in or out of court, or the lawyer’s advocating 
his own discriminatory view, no matter how offensive, in bar speeches, 
corporate board meetings, church meetings, published writings, civic 
association functions, or other avenues of expression in the lawyer’s personal 
life, or in his professional life outside of client representation.211   
This and the other limitations of the proposed rule (it did not apply to 
confidential communications or to a lawyer’s decision whom to represent), 
the Section argued, best protected both the constitutional freedom of 
lawyers and clients to speak and the “fair and efficient workings of the 
 
205. Compare id. at 61 (using broader language), with Report No. 1 of the Young Lawyers Division, 
supra note 197, at 353 (using narrower language).  
206. See Report No. 3, supra note 191, at 106 (providing the Committee proposal).  
207. See supra note 199 (discussing the proposals). 
208. Criminal Justice Section, supra note 200, at 207. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 208. 
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justice system.”212  The Section’s final Comment reminded lawyers that 
conduct not within this rule would be “inconsistent with what it means to 
be an officer of the court,” and referenced the ABA’s 1995 Resolution 
Against Bias and Prejudice.213   
In its Report in support of this supplemental provision and commentary, 
the Criminal Justice Section noted that sixteen states and the District of 
Columbia had adopted some ethics code provision discouraging or 
prohibiting “lawyer race, gender, ethnicity, or other category-based 
discrimination, or lawyer manifestations of bias or prejudice.”214  Those 
statements varied widely in scope, including some that arguably raised 
“concerns about free speech and lawyers’ ability to earn a living.”215  The 
Section’s goal was to provide, without raising constitutional concerns, 
“some teeth in the form of a disciplinary rule,” for a policy statement was 
simply ineffective in regulating discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and 
ethnicity.216 
The Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was also back 
that year with a proposal to add a new Comment [2] (later renumbered as 
Comment [3]) to Rule 8.4.217  This proposed Comment was nearly identical 
to Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(6), and intentionally so.  The 
Committee believed the language adopted by the House in 1990 “best 
effectuate[d]” the ABA’s Resolution Against Bias and Prejudice.218  
Adopting the language of Canon 3B(6) also meant proposed Comment [2] 
was nearly identical to the Committee’s 1994 proposal, including limiting its 
scope to behavior in “representing a client.”219  The proposed Comment 
exempted “legitimate advocacy,” but did not include an exception from 




214. Id. at 209. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 211. 
217. Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
81, 81 (1998). 
218. Id. at 82. 
219. Id. at 81. 
220. Id. 
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Both proposals were withdrawn before discussion in the House,221 but 
the issue returned in August 1998.222  The House adopted the Committee’s 
amended addition of new Comment [2].223  The amendment added the final 
sentence to protect lawyers in criminal practice.224  As approved, it stated, 
[2] A lawyer, who in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests 
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status, violates 
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.  Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate 
paragraph (d).  A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were 
exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this 
rule.225 
Comment [2] applied only to instances when the lawyer was acting “in the 
course of representing a client.”226  It further required the lawyer 
“knowingly” to manifest bias or prejudice by “words or conduct.”227  The 
Comment also required a showing that “such actions are prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”228  Finally, a lawyer was not subject to discipline 
solely upon a finding by a court that the lawyer had exercised peremptory 
challenges on a discriminatory basis.229 
Neither the Ethics 2000 Commission nor the Ethics 20/20 Commission 
offered any recommendations to add a Rule 8.4(g).  For fifteen years, 
Comment [2] served as the ABA’s statement regarding the discipline of 
lawyers for discriminatory or harassing behavior.  In 2014, a renewed effort 
to add an anti-discrimination rule began. 
 
221. Proceedings of the 1998 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123:1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 25 
(1998). 
222. Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Presented Jointly with the 
Criminal Justice Section, 123:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 611, 611 (1998) [hereinafter Standing Committee]. 
223. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123:2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1, 46 (1998). 
224. See Standing Committee, supra note 222, at 611 (exempting discriminatory exercise of 





229. Id.; see Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 223, at 46 (adopting 
and reprinting the Comment). 
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B. Core Values and Drafting Model Rule 8.4(g) 
1. Rule 8.4(g)  
In 2016, with “no debate in the House and few overt signs of opposition,” 
the House of Delegates added Rule 8.4(g) to the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.230  If by this statement the authors intended to 
convey the impression of a near-universal agreement among lawyers that 
Rule 8.4(g), as written, was now unobjectionable, that would be 
misleading.231  As adopted, Model Rule 8.4(g) declares:  
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
. . . engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.  This paragraph 
does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a 
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.  This paragraph does not 
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.232 
Rule 8.4(g) extended the scope of earlier efforts to prohibit harassment and 
discrimination by lawyers in several ways.  First, it sanctioned the use of the 
attorney disciplinary system as an additional tool to mitigate or eliminate 
harassment and discrimination.  Second, the standard of culpability was 
whether the lawyer “reasonably should know”; actual knowledge, as 
required in Comment [2], was no longer the standard.233  Third, it added 
 
230. Laird & Podgers, supra note 34 at 59; see also Dennis Rendleman, The Crusade Against Model 
Rule 8.4(g), ABA (Oct. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/ 
2018/october-2018/the-crusade-against-model-rule-8-4-g-/ [https://perma.cc/2YGA-D2CK] (“All 
the issues being raised against Rule 8.4(g) were raised during the three-year development process, and 
were considered by the drafters, and are accommodated in the balance that Rule 8.4(g) presents.  It is 
worth noting that the amendment passed the 598-member . . . ABA House of Delegates by a 
unanimous voice vote.”).  What has happened at the ABA Midyear and Annual Meetings since 2014 
must be pieced together from ABA Journal reports and online content made available by the ABA, for 
the most recently published ABA annual report was for the meetings held in February and August 
2013. 
231. David L. Hudson Jr., Constitutional Conflict: States Split on Model Rule Limiting Harassing 
Conduct, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2017, at 25, 25–26 (highlighting disagreement regarding the constitutionality of 
Rule 8.4(g)).  
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
233. Compare id. (including the language “reasonably should know”), with Proceedings for the Annual 
Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 223, at 46 (including the standard of actual knowledge).  
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three attributes—ethnicity, gender identity, and marital status—to the eight 
categories previously listed.234  This mostly followed the approach taken by 
the ABA in 2007 in amending the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  The 
Judicial “Code’s list of improper bases for discrimination” was enlarged to 
include “the categories of ethnicity, marital status, gender, and political 
affiliation.”235  The absence of the last category in Rule 8.4(g) indicates the 
ABA’s intention that discrimination or harassment by a lawyer on the basis 
of political affiliation concerning the practice of law is not professional 
misconduct subject to discipline.  Fourth, paragraph (g) encompassed 
“conduct related to the practice of law,” not merely conduct representing a 
client.236  Fifth, it added a client advice exception, but limited that exception 
to “legitimate advice,” a perplexing concept.237  
The House also adopted three Comments that explained the Rule’s scope.  
New Comment [3] declared “discrimination includes harmful verbal or 
physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”238  Thus, 
a lawyer who spoke or wrote in a way that manifested “bias or prejudice 
towards others” engaged in misconduct, if that verbal conduct (sometimes 
known as a “speech act”)239 was harmful.  The Comment did not explain 
what it meant by “harmful.”  Rule 2.3(C) of the 2007 Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, from which (through its 1990 predecessor) this language was 
taken, did not include a requirement of showing “harm.”240  Because 
Comment [3] did not give any examples of what was meant by 
“verbal . . . conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others,” and 
because Comment [2] to Rule 2.3 did,241 readers could apply a familiar 
transitive property of interpretation.  Examples of manifesting bias or 
prejudice included “epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative 
stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, 
intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, 
ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal 
 
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g). 
235. ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT 4 (2006), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/code-of-judicial-conduct/aba-joint-comm-
report-nov-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXX-W3VL]. 
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g). 
237. Id. (emphasis added). 
238. Id. at cmt. 3.  
239. Classic examples of verbal conduct include saying “I do” at one’s wedding or soliciting the 
listener to kill a third party.  
240. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
241. See id. at Canon 2.3 cmt. 2 (providing such examples). 
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characteristics.”242  Further, Comment [3] stated harassment included 
“sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical 
conduct.”243  If a lawyer engaged in “derogatory or demeaning verbal . . . 
conduct,” no showing of harm was required.244 Comment [3] gave 
examples of sexual harassment, but did not explain what constituted 
“derogatory or demeaning” verbal conduct.245 
Comment [4] defined “[c]onduct related to the practice of law” as 
extending to “participating in bar association, business or social activities in 
connection with the practice of law.”246  In fostering ABA Goal III, this 
Comment also declared not violative of the rule any “conduct undertaken 
to promote diversity and inclusion,” such as “recruiting, hiring, retaining 
and advancing diverse employees.”247  Implicit within this statement is the 
use by lawyers of the spoken or written word “to promote diversity and 
inclusion.” 
Finally, Comment [5] retained the exemption that a judicial finding that a 
lawyer made peremptory challenges on a discriminatory basis was, alone, 
insufficient to violate Rule 8.4(g).248  It added another exemption by stating 
a lawyer does not violate the rule by “limiting the scope or subject matter of 
the lawyer’s practice or by limiting the lawyer’s practice to members of 
underserved populations.”249  The breadth of “scope or subject matter” is 
unclear.  For example, would it permit a lawyer to limit a 
matrimonial/divorce practice to men in matters against women?250 
 
242. Id. 
243. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
244. Id. 
245. Id.  The previous Comment [3] (originally Comment [2]) was deleted because its provisions 
were substantially moved to the rule itself. 
246. Id. at cmt. 4. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at cmt. 5. 
249. Id. 
250. Cf. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (M.C.A.D. 1997), aff’d, Nathanson v. Mass. 
Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Sept. 16, 2003) 
(upholding a ruling by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination of gender discrimination 
by a lawyer for refusing to take the case of a potential male client because she limited her practice to 
women).  See generally Michele N. Struffolino, For Men Only: A Gap in the Rules Allows Sex Discrimination 
to Avoid Ethical Challenge, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 487 (2015) (highlighting a pre-8.4(g) 
discussion of the ethics of limiting practice to men only); Bradley S. Abramson, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): 
Constitutional and Other Concerns for Matrimonial Lawyers, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 283 (2019) 
(presenting a post-8.4(g) discussion). 
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2. Debating and Adopting Rule 8.4(g)  
“Diversity, inclusion, and equity, both in the legal profession and in the 
pursuit of justice, are core values of the American Bar Association . . . .”251  
To aid in reaching Goal III, the ABA created several commissions with 
particular responsibilities.252  In May 2014, leaders of four of those 
commissions wrote encouraging the Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility to “draft amendments to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct that would directly address lawyer bias, prejudice, and 
harassment  in the black letter of the Rules.”253  In the view of the Goal III 
commissions, Comment [3] (formerly 1998 Comment [2], unchanged other 
than in number) to Rule 8.4 was “not sufficient for this purpose.”254  
The Committee drafted an initial proposal to amend Rule 8.4 in summer 
2015; a second was produced at the end of the year.255  The second version 
was released for public comment and was the subject of a two-hour hearing 
at the ABA’s February 2016 meeting.256  Unlike the favorable testimony for 
the rule at this hearing, written comments on the proposed rule were 
mixed.257  One divisive subject was the breadth of the rule’s application.  
 
251. AM. BAR ASS’N, GOAL III REPORT 2020: THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE ABA’S 
LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERS 3 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin 
istrative/diversity-inclusion-center/2020_goal_iii_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3K5-9YKW]. 
252. See id. (listing the commissions).  The Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the 
Profession, Commission on Women in the Profession, Commission on Disability Rights, Commission 
on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and Commission on Hispanic Legal Rights and 
Responsibilities, as well as several other entities, are housed in the ABA’s Diversity and Inclusion 
Center.  Id.; see also Diversity and Inclusion Center, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5JH-RV57] (providing information about the various commissions). 
253. STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP., AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISIONS TO MODEL 
RULE 8.4, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter Language Choice Narrative], https://lalegalethics.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015-07-16-ABA-Proposed-Amendment-to-Rule-8.4-re-Harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
S4HJ-6NCQ] (providing a working discussion draft). 
254. See id. (indicating the text of the letter is found in Appendix A, which is not attached to the 
document online). 
255. See id. at 2–3 (presenting the initial draft proposal); Memorandum from Am. Bar Ass’n 
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. 2–3 (Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter ABA Memorandum on 
Rule 8.4 Amendment], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional 
_responsibility/rule_8_4_language_choice_memo_12_22_2015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/M7MG-5XGT] (proposing a revised draft).  The successive versions of paragraph (g) and 
accompanying Comments are detailed in Halaby & Long, supra note 33 at 212–15, 223–31. 
256. Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 216.  See generally Transcript of Hearing on Proposed 
Amendment to Model Rule 8.4, Am. Bar Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/ 
february_2016_public_hearing_transcript.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2UB-43SW]. 
257. Halaby & Long, supra note 33, at 218–23. 
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The Goal III Commissions urged the rule be as broadly applicable as 
possible. That included eliminating the actual knowledge requirement.258  
Other ABA groups were less enthusiastic, and the nearly 500 written 
comments, most by individuals, were “[o]verwhelmingly . . . negative.”259  
A third version, which omitted any scienter element, was published in 
spring 2016.  This draft also broadly interpreted “conduct related to the 
practice of law.”260  It was also the first version to include in the comments 
the exception that conduct (again, implicitly speech as well as actions) 
intended to promote diversity did not violate the rule.261  Shortly before the 
August 2016 meeting, a fourth version was substituted for the third.  It 
added the “reasonably should know” (and actual knowledge) standard and 
brought back several other exceptions, such as the statement in the 
comment that a judicial finding that a lawyer made peremptory challenges 
on a constitutionally discriminatory basis was alone not sufficient to violate 
the rule.262  Less than ten days later, a fifth and final version was offered to 
meet the demands of those ABA entities wavering or opposed to the 
proposal.  This version added the final sentence, “This paragraph does not 
preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”263  
Added at this late hour, what the ABA meant by “legitimate” advice or 
advocacy was unstated.  Further, by including in paragraph (g) that speech 
in the form of legitimate “advice” did not violate the rule, was the 
implication of this statement that other types of “speech” could violate the 
rule?  On agreement to this last pre-debate amendment, dissension 
dissipated, and paragraph (g) passed with no debate and little public 
opposition in the House of Delegates. 
Half of the states had no anti-discrimination rule as of 2016.264 
 
258. Id. at 218. 
259. Id. at 221. 
260. Id. at 224. 
261. Id. at 225, 227. 
262. Id. at 228–30. 
263. Id. at 230–31.  See STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP. ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 1 (2016), https://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/final_revised_resolution_and_
report_109.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSM5-FGQX] (printing a redlined final version of proposed 
paragraph (g)). 
264. Cf. Language Choice Narrative, supra note 253, at 1 (noting, in 2015, twenty-four jurisdictions 
had adopted anti-bias or anti-harassment provisions in their lawyer disciplinary rules); Rendleman, supra 
note 230 (noting, in 2018, “more than 25 jurisdictions” had provisions “making it an ethical violation 
for a lawyer to discriminate or harass another”).  An updated comparison to November 2020 is 
available at CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA 
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C. Core Values and Interpreting Rule 8.4(g), 2016–2020 
1. Formal Opinion 493 (2020) 
Since the adoption by the ABA of Model Rule 8.4(g), four states—
Vermont (2017),265 Maine (2019),266 New Mexico (2020),267 and 
Pennsylvania (2020)268—have adopted some variant of Model 
Rule 8.4(g).269  No state appellate court has written an opinion interpreting 
its version of Rule 8.4(g) in a disciplinary matter since mid-2016. 
 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 8.4: MISCONDUCT (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_
8_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UR6-DKGD] (providing comparisons by state as of November 9, 2020). 
265. VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021). 
266. ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021) (stating it is unprofessional conduct for 
a lawyer to “engage in conduct or communication related to the practice of law that the lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity.  (1) ‘Discrimination’ on the basis 
of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity as 
used in this section means conduct or communication that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
manifests an intention: to treat a person as inferior based on one or more of the characteristics listed 
in this paragraph; to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of 
one or more of the listed characteristics; or to cause or attempt to cause interference with the fair 
administration of justice based on one or more of the listed characteristics.  (2) ‘Harassment’ on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity 
as used in this section means derogatory or demeaning conduct or communication and includes, but is 
not limited to, unwelcome sexual advances, or other conduct or communication unwelcome due to its 
implicit or explicit sexual content.  (3) ‘Related to the practice of law’ as used in the section means 
occurring in the course of representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, 
lawyers, and others while engaged in the practice of law; or operating or managing a law firm or law 
practice.  (4) Declining representation, limiting one’s practice to particular clients or types of clients, 
and advocacy of policy positions or changes in the law are not regulated by Rule 8.4(g).”). 
267. New Mexico adopted Rule 8.4(g) effective December 1, 2020.  See N.M. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 16-804(g) (2021) (noting it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct 
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital 
status in conduct related to the practice of law.  This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to 
accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 16-116 NMRA  
[New Mexico Rules Annotated].  This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy 
consistent with these rules.”). 
268. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2021).  
269. See CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264 (listing adoptions); Kristine A. 
Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in 
the Practice of Law, ABA (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_ 
industry/publications/under_construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/XUB6-
Z474] (noting, as of March 2019, Vermont had replaced an earlier version of 8.4(g) with the revised 
ABA Rule, which was also adopted by the Northern Mariana Islands, the US Virgin Islands, and 
American Samoa). 
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On July 15, 2020, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 493, offering “guidance on the 
purpose, scope, and application” of paragraph (g).270  The opinion began 
with examples of behavior that “disgrace the entire legal profession.”271  It 
then noted the breadth of paragraph (g): “[A] single instance of a lawyer 
making a derogatory sexual comment directed toward another individual in 
connection with the practice of law would likely not be severe or pervasive 
enough to violate Title VII, but would violate Rule 8.4(g).”272  The 
Committee’s example indicates speech (a “single . . . derogatory sexual 
comment”) that does not violate Title VII, and therefore is unlikely to be 
characterized as verbal conduct, violates paragraph (g). 
Though the Opinion does not use the phrase “core values,” it explains 
the justification of paragraph (g) in those terms.  For example, it notes: 
“Preventing sexual harassment is a particular objective of” the rule.273  This 
meets an important aspect of Goal III.  It seems unexceptional to believe 
that lawyers who were victims of sexual harassment might reasonably 
consider leaving and have left the legal profession.  Even if such victims 
eventually decided to remain in the practice of law, such an experience could 
negatively affect them, and thus, impinge the core value of diversity.  
Similarly, the Opinion, quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court, discusses the 
impact of “racially-biased actions” by lawyers: Such actions “not only 
undermine confidence in our system of justice, but also erode the very 
foundation upon which justice is based.”274  In addition to the impact on 
the lawyers and others who are subjected to racially discriminatory actions 
by lawyers, such actions impair core values of the legal profession: the duties 
to improve the system of justice, to promote justice, and to contribute to 
the legal system’s capacity to do justice. 
The Formal Opinion concludes with five hypothetical instances to which 
paragraph (g) might apply.  Unfortunately, the hypotheticals are simple, 
possibly simplistic.  (In its defense, it appears the Committee was in part 
 
270. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 1 (2020) [hereinafter Formal 
Op. 493]. 
271. Id. at 2 (quoting Mullaney v. Aude, 730 A.2d 759, 767 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)).  The 
opinion cites cases involving “derogatory, sexual comments,” id., and “race-based misconduct,” id. at 2 
n.6.  
272. Id. at 4. 
273. Id. at 7. 
274. Id. at 11 (quoting In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct, 597 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 
1999). 
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responding to arguments attacking the rule.)  The first three outline some 
of the limits of paragraph (g).  The initial hypothetical affirms a lawyer may 
represent a religious organization challenging, on constitutional grounds, an 
ordinance requiring gender-neutral bathrooms.275  This is answered in 
paragraph (g)’s text.  Why the Committee offered a hypothetical so prosaic 
is unclear.  The Opinion then oddly includes this sentence in its “answer”: 
“Though individuals may disagree with the position the lawyer in the 
hypothetical would be defending, that would not affect the legitimacy of the 
representation.”276  The American lawyer is steeped in the core values that 
even the most unpopular person (the “worst of the worst”) deserves 
representation (recall the ABA’s swift response to attacks on lawyers 
representing Guantanamo detainees in 2007) and that the adversary system 
testing “disagreements” is central to the American system of justice.  In a 
formal opinion to lawyers about the “legitimacy” of representing clients 
making non-frivolous constitutional claims, to include this sentence is 
baffling.  The second hypothetical is based on an actual argument made by 
law professor Richard Sander regarding affirmative action.277  In general, 
the argument suggests affirmative action may have deleterious 
consequences for some African-American students, including law students.  
The hypothetical considers whether making such an argument in a speech 
to lawyers is subject to discipline.278  The answer is no.  Again, one aspect 
of its explanation strikes an odd note.  The Opinion states, “the lawyer’s 
remarks, without more, would not constitute” a violation of 
paragraph (g).279  What constitutes “more” is unstated.280  It is a deeply 
unsatisfying answer, for it seems to assume that some aspect of one’s 
opinion might not pass muster.  The third hypothetical to which 
paragraph (g) does not apply is a lawyer’s membership in a legal organization 
that “advocates, on religious grounds, for the ability of private employers to 
terminate or refuse to employ individuals based on their sexual orientation 
or gender identity.”281  The answer ends by declaring a lawyer may “express 
 
275. Id. at 12. 
276. Id.  
277. RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012). 
278. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 12. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 13. 
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the view” that a decision of the Supreme Court is wrong.282  This is cold 
comfort.  As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in 1953 of the Supreme Court, 
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are final.”283  If this were not the case, then doublespeak would be the 
language of the day.  
The final two hypotheticals offer two examples when a lawyer, in the 
Committee’s opinion, has violated paragraph (g).284  In the first 
(hypothetical 4), a lawyer and adjunct professor has “made repeated 
comments about the student’s appearance and also made unwelcome, 
nonconsensual physical contact of a sexual nature with the student.”285  
This case presents no interpretive difficulties.  Why would the Committee 
expend any effort on such a simple case?  
The last hypothetical offers more food for thought, but it is 
disappointingly incomplete and possibly misleading.  A lawyer-partner is at 
the office planning a new associate orientation program with “a senior 
associate.”  Apparently to this associate, and only this associate, the partner 
says, “Rule #1 should be never trust a Muslim lawyer.  Rule #2 should be 
never represent a Muslim client.  But, of course, we are not allowed to speak 
the truth around here.”286  This statement is “related to the practice of law,” 
triggering paragraph (g).287  The Opinion concludes the partner has 
violated paragraph (g) even if the senior associate is not Muslim and the 
remarks are not directed to anyone in particular.288  The Opinion does not 
state that the associate has family members or intimate friends who are 
Muslim and are known as Muslim by the partner.  This limits the ability of 
a factfinder to conclude the partner’s speech is verbal conduct, something 
more than simply speech.  The Opinion offers no explanation why the 
speech of this partner to this (non-Muslim) senior associate is verbal 
conduct.  Next, for the partner’s remarks to manifest bias or prejudice, the 
Opinion must assume the partner is not Muslim and is speaking in a deadly 
earnest and serious tone.289  Beyond that, the partner is a cipher.  What 
 
282. Id.  
283. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
284. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13–14. 
285. Id. at 13. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 14. 
288. Id. at 13–14. 
289. One assumes a sarcastic comment does not manifest bias or prejudice but is its opposite.   
If the partner is Muslim, then one might assume the partner is joking or otherwise insincere in making 
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could possibly possess a partner to consider as “Rule #1” never to trust a 
Muslim lawyer?  The Pew Research Center estimated “about 3.45 million 
Muslims of all ages” in the United States as of 2017.290  The estimated 
number of American lawyers as of 2020 is 1,328,692.291  The estimated 
population of the United States in 2019 was 328,239,523,292 making lawyers 
approximately 0.4% of the population.  If those numbers held (which is a 
guess), then there are fewer than 14,000 Muslim lawyers in the entire United 
States and its territories.  The senior associate is also an abstraction, so we 
have no context to understand why the partner would confide in the 
associate beliefs that the firm has apparently rejected (“But, of course, we 
are not allowed to speak the truth around here”).293 
The Opinion makes additional assumptions: It declares “[t]he partner’s 
remarks are discriminatory in so far as they are harmful and manifest bias 
and prejudice against Muslims.”294  The Opinion provides no explanation 
of how one determines whether harm has occurred.  And harmful to what?  
Or to whom?  That is, must a person be harmed, or can one claim such 
remarks corrode the institutions of the law and thus generate harm?  Must 
that harm be shown through some evidence?  If so, what evidence counts?  
If a new associate in the firm learned of the partner’s remarks through 
hearsay (rather than the partner repeating the remarks to the new associate) 
and believed the remarks have or will negatively affect the associate’s 
opportunity to succeed in the firm, is that belief sufficient to decide harm 
has occurred?  It may be the Opinion is suggesting this unenlightened 
comment is necessarily harmful, but that is a mere inference.  The closest 
the Opinion comes to that view is its speculation that the partner’s “remarks 
may influence how similarly-situated firm lawyers treat clients, opposing 
counsel, and others at the firm who are Muslim.”295  First, that would 
 
these remarks.  The speaker’s tone is often critical to understanding the remarks, and tone often plays 
poorly when translated to the written word. 
290. Besheer Mohamed, New Estimates Show U.S. Muslim Population Continues to Grow, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-
muslim-population-continues-to-grow/ [https://perma.cc/KTH6-PKFR]. 
291. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 2020, at 106 (2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/potlp2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JDQ5-YX3V].  This includes all lawyers, not just the subset of those practicing law.  
292. 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation’s Growth is Slowing, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/popest-nation. 
html [https://perma.cc/27PW-DBG6]. 
293. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13. 
294. Id.  
295. Id. at 14. 
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require the remarks to travel to others in the firm, and require the partner’s 
influence to be so great that other lawyers decide simply to follow along in 
making the factually-free claims that Muslim lawyers are untrustworthy and 
Muslims should never be clients.  Again, that assumption ignores the part 
of the statement made by the partner, “But, of course, we are not allowed 
to speak the truth around here.”  Taken at face value, “we are not allowed” 
indicates the partner’s views are rejected by the firm or some significant 
group in the firm.  Why would any other lawyer in the firm take on a 
minority (I assume) position when that opinion is generally disapproved by 
those who wield power?  Second, “may influence” suggests no proof of ill-
treatment of Muslims is required.  It’s enough that it might happen.  Third, 
the Opinion assumes a senior associate so under the partner’s thumb that 
the associate’s moral agency is lost.  Again, the partner’s view is (apparently) 
a minority view, as declared in the hypothetical itself.  That strengthens the 
associate’s moral position, including disagreeing with the partner.  This 
argument requires much more to be persuasive.  Finally, the associate may 
simply ignore the comment as a futile rant of a bigoted lawyer and learn to 
intentionally think about how not to speak in stereotypical, discriminatory 
fashion.  
Is factually related criticism that includes a mention of a listed category 
sufficient to manifest bias?  For example, a lawyer is well known in the 
community for his assertions regarding the importance of his religious faith 
in his life and how it informs the manner in which he practices law.  He is 
charged with fraud upon the court, or suborning perjury, or bribing a juror.  
Opposing counsel says in a comment published in the newspaper, “That 
lawyer isn’t a real Christian, but a servant of his own greed; his dirty tricks 
were finally uncovered by the court, and I’m going to be the first to throw 
him to the wolves on the disciplinary committee.” 
The Opinion also assumes “the partner surely knew or reasonably should 
have known this.”296  That is not necessarily true.  For example, it is no 
secret that the nations of Pakistan and India are not frenemies, much less 
allies.  It is also no secret that Muslims in India are often the victims of 
religious discrimination.297  If the hypothetical partner was a Hindu and 
emigrant from India who represented Hindu clients, the comments might 
 
296. Id. at 13. 
297. For two fictional examples, see VIKRAM CHANDRA, SACRED GAMES (2006) (presenting a 
recurring motif of religious tension and discrimination in India, and offering a gripping interlude of the 
movement of Muslims from India to newly formed Pakistan) and the Oscar-winning movie SLUMDOG 
MILLIONAIRE (Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. 2008) (telling the Oscar-winning story of a young Indian man). 
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“manifest bias and prejudice against Muslims,”298 but also might manifest 
a desire to protect the partner’s livelihood by hewing ever more tightly to 
this particular legal practice.  Should the lawyer know that these remarks 
were harmful manifestations of bias or prejudice against Muslims?  Is the 
lawyer’s background (born in India, Hindu, represents Hindu clients) 
evidence for or against possession of knowledge that the remarks manifest 
bias or prejudice?  Would evidence of both motives be sufficient to 
determine the partner had violated Rule 8.4(g)? 
More generally, the manner in which one speaks (or doesn’t) to persons 
who are not intimate family and friends is often guided by a particular and 
largely tacit cultural understanding.  One of the justifications the Committee 
gave for adopting Rule 8.4(g) was the “need for a cultural shift in 
understanding the inherent integrity of people regardless of their race [and 
the other ten listed categories].”299  In a nation that is as diverse as the 
United States, with lawyers a part of or with ties to those many diverse 
communities, it is difficult to understand the language of “a cultural shift.”  
The effect of particular cultural understandings on whether and how one 
speaks, as well as how one responds to (perceived) discriminatory 
comments, are not uniform in the United States.  The Opinion ignores the 
many cultures of the United States and its lawyers in pursuit of what it finds 
to be “a” cultural problem.300 
2. Greenberg v. Haggerty (2020) 
In 1995, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility chose 
to offer an aspirational “policy statement” condemning discriminatory 
speech and conduct rather than an ethics rule because, as its chair told the 
House, “no satisfactory rule could be drawn” that “would not unduly 
impinge on the First Amendment.”301  In December 2020, five months 
after the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued 
Formal Opinion 493, a federal district court held unconstitutional, on free 
speech grounds, Pennsylvania’s Rule 8.4(g) in a pre-enforcement lawsuit.302 
 
298. Formal Op. 493, supra note 270, at 13. 
299. ABA Memorandum on Rule 8.4 Amendment, supra note 255, at 1–2 (quoting and 
adopting, as “eloquently” stated, a statement of the Oregon New Lawyers Division to the YLD). 
300. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) (discussing human societies, culture, and cultural symbolism). 
301. Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Assembly, supra note 202, at 61. 
302. See Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 32 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding Pennsylvania’s 
Rule 8.4(g) unconstitutional on First Amendment viewpoint discrimination grounds). 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) is an amalgamation of 
Model Rule 8.4(g) and the 1998 Comment [2] to Rule 8.4.  It declares: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(g) in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly manifest bias or 
prejudice, or engage in harassment or discrimination, as those terms are 
defined in applicable federal, state or local statutes or ordinances, including 
but not limited to bias, prejudice, harassment or discrimination based upon 
race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status.  This 
paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw 
from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.  This paragraph does not 
preclude advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.303     
Zachary Greenberg, a Pennsylvania lawyer who “speaks and writes” “on a 
variety of controversial issues,”304  sued the chair of the Pennsylvania 
attorney disciplinary board alleging paragraph (g) was a content-based and 
viewpoint-based infringement of his free speech rights, as incorporated in 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.305  Greenberg had 
not been charged with violating paragraph (g) by the disciplinary board.306  
The court held the rule unconstitutional.307   
Pennsylvania’s paragraph (g) bans “words or conduct [that] knowingly 
manifest bias or prejudice.”308  Neither the ABA’s nor Pennsylvania’s 
Comments to Rule 8.4 offer any examples of what kinds of words or 
conduct manifest bias or prejudice.  However, this language tracks 
1998 Comment [2] to Model Rule 8.4.309  Comment [2] in turn substantially 
followed Canon 3B(6) of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.310  
Canon 3B(6) became Rule 2.3(C) of the 2007 Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, unchanged in relevant part.311  Model Rule 2.3(C) and the 
 
303. Id. at 16-17 (quoting PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2020)). 
304. Id. at 16. 
305. Id. at 17. 
306. See id. at 21 (stating there was “no history of past enforcement” of the Amendment).  
307. Id. at 32. 
308. Id. at 16. 
309. See Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 217, at 81 
(including the text of Comment [2]). 
310. As discussed above, Comment [2] added the “knowingly” requirement.  See supra 
notes 217–19, 227 and accompanying text. 
311. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (adding the 
phrase “or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to” after 
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accompanying Comments were adopted by Pennsylvania in its Code of 
Judicial Conduct.312  Those Comments gave examples of words or conduct 
that manifest bias or prejudice. 
The court thus turned to Comment [2], which declared examples of 
manifesting bias or prejudice “include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; 
demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon 
stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of 
connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant 
references to personal characteristics.”313  This Comment has great value 
in its context.  The goal of Rule 2.3 of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial 
Conduct is to provide a sense to all who are present that not only is justice 
being done in the courts, but that it is perceived as being done.  Any judge 
who uses racial, ethnic, or other slurs “in the performance of judicial duties,” 
or who allows a lawyer to do so “in proceedings before the court,” fails to 
act as an unbiased and neutral arbiter, both of which are necessary to do 
justice.314  Even if justice is substantively done (however accounted for), a 
judge who makes demeaning statements and acts in a biased or prejudicial 
fashion toward anyone while performing the duties of a government official 
will not be seen to have done justice.  Such words or conduct would violate 
core values of the profession by failing to promote justice, enhance the 
capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice, and improve the system 
of justice. 
Such offensive and deplorable language made by a person outside of a 
court proceeding or performing one’s judicial duties is not, however, left 
unprotected by the First Amendment.315  The court decided that included 
lawyers.  The disciplinary board argued Pennsylvania was permitted to 
restrict the speech of lawyers on professional speech grounds.  The court 
 
“prejudice,” and adding gender, ethnicity, marital status, and political affiliation to the list of attributes 
regarding which speech and conduct was banned).   
312. The only change made by Pennsylvania was to use the phrase “gender identity or 
expression” instead of the Model Code’s “gender.”  Compare PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
Canon 2.3(C) (2014) (including Pennsylvania’s change), with MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
Canon 2.3(C) (using only “gender”).  
313. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 32 (E.D. Pa. 2020).  See PA. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT Canon 2.3 cmt. 2 (2014) (“Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties 
and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice.   
A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.”). 
314. PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.3(B)–(C) (2014). 
315. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65 (2017) (discussing the broad 
reach of First Amendment rights and how a “disparagement clause” violates Free Speech rights). 
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rejected the argument,316 and held paragraph (g)’s ban on words that 
manifest bias or prejudice was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.317   
The court did not justify its opinion on core values language.  It did note, 
however, that:  
[The] Rule represents the government restricting speech outside of the 
courtroom, outside of the context of a pending case, and even outside the 
much broader playing field of “administration of justice.”  Even if Plaintiff 
makes a good faith attempt to restrict and self-censor, the Rule leaves Plaintiff 
with no guidance as to what is in bounds, and what is out, other than to advise 
Plaintiff to scour every nook and cranny of each ordinance, rule, and law in 
the Nation.318 
ABA President Thomas Wells made “independence of the bar and 
judiciary” one of the four “common core values all lawyers share” in his 
inaugural message to ABA members.319  The court implicitly found 
paragraph (g) a threat to that independence.  A lawyer lacking guidance 
regarding “what is in bounds, and what is out” will engage in self-
censorship.320  Modifying one’s speech will reduce the lawyer’s, and thus 
the bar’s, independence from the government.  The court was also aware of 
the rule’s “beneficent intentions.”321  Those good intentions were to 
enhance diversity, another of Wells’s four goals.322  As between those core 
values, the court decided that though Pennsylvania “embarks upon a 
friendly, favorable tide, this tide sweeps us all along with the admonished, 
minority viewpoint into the massive currents of suppression . . . .”323  
 
316. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 26–30.  See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 
585 U.S. _____, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–73 (2018) (holding “[the] Court’s precedents do not recognize 
such a tradition for a category called ‘professional speech[,]’” and noting only two exceptions: 1) when 
the speech is commercial speech, and 2) when “regulations of professional conduct . . . incidentally 
burden speech”).  The Greenberg court concluded, “Rule 8.4(g) does not regulate the specific types of 
attorney speech or professional speech that the Supreme Court has identified as warranting a 
deferential review.  The speech that Rule 8.4(g) regulates is entitled to the full protection of the First 
Amendment.”  Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
317. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 32–33. 
318. Id. at 32. 
319. Wells, supra note 30, at 9. 
320. See Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 31–32 (describing censorship and how Pennsylvania 
Rule 8.4(g) may lead lawyers to self-censor). 
321. Id. at 32. 
322. Wells, supra note 30, at 9. 
323. Greenberg, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 32. 
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3. Other Reactions, 2016–2020 
In the aftermath of the ABA’s adoption of paragraph (g), state attorneys 
general in Texas, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Tennessee issued opinions 
concluding Model Rule 8.4(g) was unconstitutional.324  None of those 
states had adopted any version of ABA paragraph (g).325  The state supreme 
courts in Idaho,326 Tennessee,327 and Arizona328 rejected petitions to add 
paragraph (g).  Neither Idaho nor Arizona has adopted any version of 
paragraph (g).  If Greenberg stands, Vermont, Maine, and New Mexico will 
be the only three states to respond officially to the ABA’s 2016 action by 
the end of 2020.329  The joiners would make a majority, but the dissenters 
would comprise a significant minority. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
In these fractured times, it would be unsurprising if state adoption or 
rejection of paragraph (g) divided largely along political lines.  Such a result, 
even if predictable, would be deleterious to the American legal profession.  
A division along such lines might make finding common ground over some 
shared agreements about what lawyers should do, and why they should do 
it, more difficult.  Enhancing diversity and eliminating bias is and should 
remain a core value of American lawyers.  So too should the independence 
of the bar from an overweening, though well-intentioned government.  It 
may be asking too much for lawyers to agree to some resolution that satisfies 
those who give primacy to one of these core values at the expense of 
another.  At least, the profession may assist itself by looking more deeply at 
the tension between these core values.  The intractable tension lawyers face 
in attempting to meet the duties they owe is a story as old as the law itself.  
 
324. See Josh Blackman, ABA Model Rule 8.4(G) in the States, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 629, 630–33 
(2019) (summarizing opinions). 
325. See generally CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264 (listing various states’ 
adoptions and rejections).  This document does not have page numbers but is nonetheless subdivided 
by pages in a PDF format.  The reader may scroll down until the pertinent state is found alphabetically, 
scroll down counting the pages, or search using the Find function (CTRL-F on a PC or CMD-F on a 
Macintosh). 
326. Id. at 8.  
327. Id. at 23. 
328. Id. at 2.  The Montana legislature issued a joint resolution opposing adoption of 
Rule 8.4(g).  S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017).  Jurisdiction on this lies with the Montana 
Supreme Court. 
329. CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 264.  See supra notes 265–69 and 
accompanying text. 
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The duties to represent clients zealously, to serve as an officer of the court, 
and to serve the greater community as a public citizen may often clash, with 
little likelihood of resolution. 
A summer 2018 story on Law360 discussed the ABA’s rapidly shrinking 
membership.330  The report largely focused on the economic consequences 
of the membership decline to the organization.  The effect of this decline, 
of course, has a much broader impact.  For the ABA, a membership less 
than half its previous size makes it less likely the ABA will possess the 
influence to persuade other bar associations and the nation’s 1.3 million 
lawyers they should embrace specific core values.  The ABA can promulgate 
rules or policies as it wishes, but if it is perceived as representing merely a 
segment of the bar, its persuasive authority will quickly diminish.  That 
would serve as another sign that the fractured profession will be ever 
present. 
The core values problem is likely to intensify in the next decade or so.  
This is, in significant part, a problem of both definition and order, and is 
particularly related to the idea of core values that protect society’s interests.  
Can the contending parties reach some agreement on the core values that 
are the reason lawyers (still) maintain their privileged place in the American 
democratic experiment?  And will lawyers use their rhetorical and persuasive 
gifts to impress upon each other, as well as the general public, why they 
should continue to take the problem seriously, as well as humbly? 
  
 
330. See generally Aebra Coe, ABA Decline: Why Are Fewer Lawyers Joining the Club?, LAW360 
(July 24, 2018, 10:42 AM), https://www.legalmosaic.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ABA-
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